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"EGGSHELL" VICTIMS, PRIVATE
PRECAUTIONS, AND THE SOCIETAL BENEFITS
OF SHIFTING CRIME
Robert A. Mikos*
Individuals spend billions of dollars every year on precautions to protect
themselves from crime. Yet the legal academy has criticized many private
precautions because they merely shift crime onto other, less guarded citizens, rather than reduce crime. The conventional wisdom likens such
precaution-taking to rent-seeking: citizens spend resources to shift crime
losses onto other victims, without reducing the size of those losses to society. The result is an unambiguous reduction in social welfare. This Article
argues that the conventional wisdom is flawed because it overlooks how
the law systematically understates the harms suffered by some victims of
crime, first, by ignoring some types of harm altogetherin grading and sentencing decisions, and second, by ignoring wide disparities in the amount
of harm caused in individual cases. It follows that the same "crime", as
defined by the law, may inflict significantly different amounts of harm on
different victims, and by aggregation, on society. Thus it cannot be safely
assumed that displacing a given crime from one citizen to the next is necessarily wasteful, from a social point of view. Indeed, this Article argues
that shifting crime may be beneficial to society, from an economic point of
view, since eggshell victims-those who are harmed more by crime-tend
to take more precautions. The implication is that private crime fighting efforts that displace crime-universally criticized in the literature-may be
more socially useful than previously acknowledged. The Article concludes
by discussing how this insight impacts the ongoing debates over the regulation of precaution-taking.
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INTRODUCTION

The legal academy is paying increased attention to the precautions ordinary citizens take to protect themselves from crime,' and for good reason.
Citizens of the United States spend more on private precautions-estimates
range from $160 billion to $300 billion per year-than on the entire public
law enforcement budget.2 That is, citizens spend more on locks, neighborhood watches, and the like than U.S. governments (state and federal) spend
on police, judges, prosecutors, prisons, and prison guards. And these already
high estimates of private crime-fighting expenditures may not reflect the
total economic cost of precautions, including opportunity costs, like foregoing an evening out, and other difficult-to-monetize costs, like the effort
expended walking a friend home at night.3
In some situations, private precautions represent an attractive, low-cost
alternative to more traditional crime-fighting tactics, like hiring more police
1.
Any measure taken by a private individual (or firm) to reduce the risk that he or she will
be victimized by crime constitutes a precaution. Examples include devices like door locks, security

cameras, car alarms, and firearms, as well as actions like keeping valuables out of sight, using a
password on a computer, staying indoors at night, or having a neighbor watch one's home.

2. Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Epidemiology of Crime, 39 J.L.
& EcoN. 405, 407 (1996); John J. DiIulio, Jr., Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy,
10 J. ECON. PERsP. 3, 11 (1996) (noting that we spend two times as much on private as opposed to
public protections against crime).
3.

For example, one study estimates that U.S. citizens spend nearly $90 billion worth of

time each year simply locking their doors and searching for their keys. David A. Anderson, The
Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J.L. & ECON. 611, 623-24 (1999).
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or building more prisons.4 For example, some legal scholars have suggested
that private citizens may be particularly effective at combating certain types
of crime, such as cybercrime and identity theft.' More commonly, however,
scholars claim that many of the resources spent in the private war on crime
are being wasted because many private precautions only shift crime onto
other, less guarded citizens.' The conventional wisdom is that any time a
crime is displaced by a precaution from one victim to another, the precaution-taker's private gain is simply offset by the substitute victim's loss.
Thus, precautions that do no more than shift crime produce no societal benefit. But they do have costs: after all, it takes money, time, and energy to
protect oneself from crime. It follows that precautions that displace crime

are necessarily wasteful and inefficient, from a social point of view. Professors Robert Cooter and Tom Ulen, in their influential text, summarize the
prevailing view: "Redistributing crime has no net social benefit."' In economic terms, precautions that only shift crime constitute rent-seeking

behavior: individuals expend resources to transfer losses, without reducing
the size of those losses.'
An example illustrates the point. Suppose a thief sets out to steal a single
car from a crowded parking lot. The thief spies several cars in the lot that
suit his needs and tastes. However, the thief notices that one car is protected
by an antitheft device, while the others are not. Given that it would take him
some time to overcome this precaution, the thief-having no reason to prefer the protected car to the others-decides to take one of the unprotected

cars instead. In this example, the precaution did not reduce crime, it merely
displaced it. It is easy to see why, from a social point of view, existing
scholarship considers such precaution-taking wasteful. Although the car's
owner incurred costs in protecting her vehicle, she generated no corresponding societal benefit; that is, there was no net reduction in crime.

Concerns over crime displacement have also played an important role in
policy debates over both public and private crime-control measures.' Given

4.

Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the

Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 343-44 (1984) (asserting that public and private protection are substitutes and that private citizens should bear more of the burden of preventing crime since
they are often the least-cost avoiders); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 241
(6th ed. 2003) (arguing that public and private crime prevention efforts may be substitutes).

5. E.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 107780 (2001) (suggesting that it costs far less for private firms to secure computer records than it does
for governments to identify, prosecute, and punish cybercriminals).
6. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1996); Steven Shavell, Individual
Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT'L REv. L. & EcON.
123 (1991).
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICs 476 (4th ed. 2004) (emphasis
7.
added). For other voices reflecting the conventional wisdom, see sources cited infra notes 41-43.

8. The theory of rent-seeking is attributed to Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariff
Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
9.
For a discussion of the impact of displacement on policy and policy discourse, see infra
Section I.D.
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the prevailing view that displacement is necessarily wasteful, policy makers
have sought to discourage or even ban the use of precautions that merely
displace crime onto other citizens. Two prominent criminologists have observed as follows:

'

There is little point in the policy maker investing resources and effort into
situational prevention if by doing so he merely shuffles crime from one
area to the next but never reduces it. For this reason the possibility of displacing crime by preventative intervention is a crucial issue for the policy
maker.

This Article argues that extant scholarship and subsequent policy debates have mistakenly condemned displacement on efficiency grounds. The
scholarly literature incorrectly assumes that the societal cost of any given
crime is identical for all victims. By making this assumption, the literature
has overlooked the societal benefits of displacing crime.
The Article demonstrates that the way the law grades and punishes
crime systematically understates the magnitude of the harms suffered by
some victims-whom this Article calls "eggshell" victims." First, the law
ignores some types of harm, such as the destruction of sentimental value, in
grading and punishing criminal offenses. Second, the law treats some criminal acts the same, in spite of the fact that the harms inflicted by them are
obviously different. In some jurisdictions, for example, the theft of $100,000
is treated the same as the theft of $200,000; both are considered "grand larceny" and trigger identical sanctions. For both reasons, any two instances of
the same "crime" (as presently defined by the law) may impose different
societal costs. Thus it cannot be safely assumed that displacing any given
crime from one citizen to the next is necessarily wasteful, from a social
point of view. Society is better off when crime is committed against typical
(i.e., low-harm), as opposed to eggshell victims. Hence, to the extent a precaution steers crime away from eggshell victims-who are more likely to
purchase the precaution-it has some social value, even if it does not reduce
the crime rate. This argument has profound implications for the private war
on crime and the ongoing debate over crime displacement.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the economics of private precautions and briefly reviews the legal, economic, and criminological
literature on the subject. This Part explains why the literature has been so

10. Kevin Heal & Gloria Laycock, Principles, Issues and FurtherAction, in SITUATIONAL
CRIME PREVENTION: FROM THEORY INTO PRACTICE 123 (Kevin Heal & Gloria Laycock eds., 1986).
11.

Eggshell victims are individuals who suffer harms, such as the loss of sentimental value,

beyond those that the typical victim of crime suffers. An individual may be an eggshell victim for
purposes of one crime, e.g., the theft of his wedding ring, because he is sentimentally attached to it,
but not necessarily for purposes of other crimes, e.g., the theft of his camera or some other posses-

sion, for which he experiences no atypical loss. The concept of the eggshell victim of crime is thus
similar to the concept of the "eggshell skull" plaintiff in tort law. There is, however, one important
difference. Tort law usually holds defendants liable for all of the harms they cause eggshell skull
plaintiffs, including idiosyncratic harms. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1965). By

contrast, criminal law often neglects to consider eggshell victims' idiosyncratic harms for purposes
of grading and punishing criminal offenses. See infra Sections ll.A-B.

"Eggshell" Victims
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uniformly critical of displacement, and how that assessment has affected
policy discourse. Part II then critiques the assumption made in the extant
scholarship that the societal cost of any given crime is identical across victims. It argues that the way the law grades and punishes crime is a poor
proxy for the total harm done in any individual case. It also explains why
eggshell victims are not more attractive targets for criminals, and thus why
shifting crime can reduce the cost of crime to society without simultaneously reducing the incentives to commit crime. Finally, Part III explains why
precautions tend to shift crime from eggshell victims onto lower-harm victims, resulting in a net reduction in the societal cost of crime. It also
discusses the implications for policy making. The Conclusion offers some
observations on future research, including noneconomic considerations that
may play a larger role in the debate over crime displacement in the future.

I. THE

ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME DISPLACEMENT

Much of the extant legal and economic scholarship on precautions and
crime control is devoted to studying the displacement phenomenon. Section
L.A discusses the private incentives to take precautions. It explains that private precautions generate externalities-including crime displacementand, as a result, private citizens may take more or less than the socially optimal level of precautions. Section I.B focuses on the most studied and
influential externality-that of crime displacement-and examines the conditions under which precautions are likely to displace crime onto other citizens.
Section I.C then explores why legal theorists and economists have concluded

that precautions that displace crime generate no societal benefit and are thus
necessarily wasteful, from a societal perspective. Section I.D discusses the

impact that concerns over displacement have had on policy discourse.
A. The Private Incentives to Take Precautions

Individuals take precautions to
losses, which are a function of both
would be suffered if the crime occurs
criminal by making it more difficult

reduce their expected crime-related
the crime rate (p) and the harm that
(H). Precautions ward off a would-be
to commit a crime, or by raising the

chances that the offender will be caught and punished for the intended of-

fense. For example, locking the door makes it more difficult for a burglar to
enter a home, while installing a security camera makes it easier for the po-

lice to identify and later punish the burglar. The risk of crime faced by
precaution-takers (p,) is thus lower than the crime rate for the general popu-

lation (p). In deciding whether to take a precaution, an individual will weigh
the benefit of the reduction in risk to her (p - pp), as measured by the reduction in the expected crime loss ((p - p,) * H), against the cost of the

precaution (C), which includes the cost to purchase it as well as the time and
energy spent to activate and deactivate it. The individual will take the
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precaution when the expected benefits exceed these costs, in other words,
when C< (p -p,)* H.
When the precaution-taker captures the full benefit of the precaution
(i.e., she does not reduce anyone else's crime risk), and also bears the full
cost of the precaution (i.e., she generates no negative externalities), the private incentives to engage in precaution-taking are socially optimal. The
crime-related loss that would otherwise be suffered by the individual is a
societal cost (and eliminating that loss represents a societal gain)," as is the
cost of taking the precaution. Hence, barring any externalities, rational individuals will take precautions only when the societal benefits outweigh the
societal costs. However, precautions often do generate externalities that the
individual will not consider when deciding whether to take a precaution.
The externalities may confer a benefit on others, e.g., by reducing the expected crime loss suffered by another party, or they may impose a cost on
others, e.g., by increasing the expected crime loss suffered by other potential
victims. When precautions generate such externalities, the private incentives
to take precautions diverge from the socially optimal incentives.
On the one hand, some precautions confer benefits on third parties, by
reducing the likelihood that they-and not just the precaution-taker-will
be victimized by crime. For example, a homeowner who installs a light in a
dark alleyway might deter would-be burglars from targeting her neighbors'
homes, and not just her own. Economists and criminologists refer to this as
the "halo effect."

4

Unless the precaution-taker can extract a payment from

her neighbors, she will take less than the socially optimal level of such
precautions."

Conversely, some precautions impose costs on third parties. Some precautions may annoy or even harm third parties. For example, a gun fired in
self-defense against an intruder may accidentally injure an innocent by-

stander. Or a car alarm may sound off in the middle of the night, waking the
entire neighborhood, and not just the car's owner.' 6 Other precautions simply
12.

This simplified model of private precaution-taking resembles the Learned Hand formula

for determining negligence in tort. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 167-70 (discussing the formula
with respect to efficient levels of care). There are more elaborate formal models of precaution-taking in
the literature, see, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter, Private Security and the Public Safety, 5 J. URB. ECON.
388 (1978); Keith N. Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 RAND J. ECON. 197
(1996); and Shavell, supra note 6, but the simplified model in the text is sufficient for present purposes.
Some economists argue that the loss to the victim must be discounted by the gain to the
13.
criminal. For a discussion of whether criminal gains should be included as part of social welfare, see

&

generally Jeff L. Lewin & William N. Trumbull, The Social Value of Crime?, 10 INT'L REv. L.
ECON. 271 (1990). Needless to say, this is a controversial
here: even if we count the criminal's (illicit) utility as part
the criminal to steer clear of eggshell victims; as discussed
gains nothing extra by targeting such victims, but eggshell
victims of the same crime.

point, but it does not affect the analysis
of societal welfare, we still might prefer
below in Section IH.C, the criminal often
victims still tend to lose more than other

111

YALE L.J. 1039, 1109 (2002).

14.

E.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Architectureas Crime Contml,

15.

The socially optimal level of precaution-taking is the point at which the marginal cost of

the precaution is equal to its marginal benefit. E.g., Clotfelter, supra note 12, at 399.

16.

E.g., John Tierney, Laws Encourage Car Alarms, but Din May Not Be Worth

TIMES, Feb. 19, 1991, at Al.

It,

N.Y.
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shift crime away from the precaution-taker-who is a relatively more difficult or risky target for the criminal-to some other victim who is less
protected and hence relatively more vulnerable. The effect of shifting an
identical crime (as presently defined by the law) from a precaution-taker to
another victim is referred to as crime displacement." Suppose A buys a
guard dog and posts a "Beware of Dog" sign on her lawn; the precaution
might dissuade a burglar from breaking into A's house, but it might not dissuade him from committing a burglary elsewhere-for example, the burglar
might decide to break into A's neighbor's house instead, assuming the
neighbor has not also posted such a warning sign. At the extreme, a precau-

tion results in what is called "total displacement": there is a one-for-one
tradeoff between crimes prevented against precaution-takers and crimes
perpetrated against persons who do not take precautions. In other words, the
precaution has no effect whatsoever upon the crime rate; it only redistributes

crime among different victims.
B. The Types of PrecautionsThat Displace Crime

Crime displacement has received more attention in the scholarly literature and has had a more significant impact on policy-making discourse than

any other externality associated with precaution-taking." The next Section
discusses why crime displacement is considered a particularly undesirable
externality. This Section discusses in more detail the reason that some precautions, but not others, tend to displace crime, by focusing on the
criminal's incentives to commit crime.
An offender will commit a crime when the expected benefits outweigh
the expected costs, including the risk of apprehension and difficulty of com-

pleting the offense, among other things.' 9 Any precaution will of course
make some potential victims more costly targets, either by increasing the

odds the criminal will be caught or by frustrating efforts to complete the
crime. But as long as there are other potential targets who do not take the

precaution, and these victims are good substitutes, in the eyes of the criminal, for the ones who self-protect, the precaution may simply shift crime
onto the more vulnerable targets. The car thief in a crowded parking garage,

17.
Criminologists have recognized at least five types of displacement, which often overlap.
These include victim, spatial, temporal, tactical, and crime-type displacement. See Thomas A. Reppetto, Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon, 22 CRIM. & DELINQ. 166, 168-69
(1976). This Article focuses on the most commonly discussed type: victim displacement, i.e., an
identical crime is shifted from the precaution-taker onto a different victim.

18. See, e.g., Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Prevention, Displacement of
Crime and Rational Choice Theory, in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: FROM THEORY INTO
PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 1, 1-3; Gloria Laycock. Property Marking as a Deterrent to Domestic
Burglary, in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: FROM THEORY INTO PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 55,
70; Philipson & Posner, supra note 2, at 409 (acknowledging that the debate over victim precautions
has focused almost exclusively on the question of whether they reduce or displace crime).
See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
19.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (explaining that the decision whether to commit an offense can be modeled as a
function of the probability of conviction and the severity of the punishment imposed if convicted).
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for example, has plenty of options if some car owners choose to lock their
vehicles; if she is intent on stealing, say, a Honda Accord (one of the most
popular vehicles among car thieves), she will probably be indifferent as to
vehicles of the same year, color, model, and so forth.20
The criminal must also be able to observe precaution-taking;2' after all, to
steer clear of victims who self protect, the criminal must be able to tell who
has taken the precaution and who remains a vulnerable target. To see why
observable precautions are more likely to displace crime, consider the example of The Club, a popular precaution against car theft. The Club is a brightly
colored, steel, U-shaped device that can be attached to a car steering wheel.
Millions have been sold since it was invented in the 1980s. The device makes
it impossible to operate a vehicle-or at least, to use the steering wheel to
guide it-while it is attached, thus foiling car thieves. The fact that one car
owner puts The Club on his car steering wheel makes it more difficult to steal
his car, but it does not increase the difficulty of stealing any other car, or increase the odds of being caught doing so. On the contrary, it is widely
believed that users of The Club probably increase the risk that cars without
The Club will be stolen.22 The manufacturer of the device explains in its marketing materials:
Compared to other types of anti-theft devices, the main advantage of The
Club is its high visibility. Thieves don't want or need to mess around with
a car that has this as a safety device when there are so many others in the
parking lot that don't have anything. It's a small price to pay to make sure
your car stays where you put it.23

By contrast, if the precaution is hidden, the criminal will have no reason to
prefer one target to the next. The criminal may continue to commit the in-

tended crime. But it is also possible that she will abandon the crime
altogether. If the criminal knows that some victims have taken a precaution,

but she is unable to observe which ones have done so, the precaution will raise
the expected cost of committing the crime against all victims. In other words,
the criminal will assume that, with some probability, each potential victim has
taken the precaution. Thus, if the precaution is taken by enough targets, it may
reduce the crime rate for everyone, and not just precaution-takers.

This is an

example of the halo effect, the flip side of crime displacement.

20.

Sometimes, of course, a criminal is interested in one, and only one particular target.

Consider the crime of domestic abuse. Presumably, the husband who is foiled in his attempt to beat
his estranged wife is unlikely to look for another victim. E.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's
Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2429 (1997) (arguing that so-called non-market offenses are

unlikely to be displaced).
21. E.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue II, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime"
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (2003).
22. E.g., BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYREs, WHY NoT?: How TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY
TO SOLVE PROBLEMs BIG AND SMALL 23-26 (2003).
23. The Club, http://www.theclub.com/default.asp (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (video advertisement on the company's webpage).
24.

Shavell, supra note 6, at 124-27.
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Consider LoJack, an antitheft device that, unlike The Club, has proven
remarkably effective at deterring, and not just displacing, car thefts. LoJack
is a hidden radio transmitter installed in automobiles. When a vehicle
equipped with LoJack is stolen, the transmitter can be activated to help police locate the vehicle instantly. Noted economists Ian Ayres and Steve
Levitt studied the LoJack device and its effect on car thefts in markets where
it is offered." The economists found that LoJack is very effective at reducing the overall rate of car theft and does not simply displace it from LoJackinstalled vehicles to other vehicles. 6 The reason is that the device makes car
theft both more perilous and also less lucrative. It more than triples the likelihood that a car thief will be caught and punished; moreover, it has been
quite successful at helping the police locate and shut down chop shops,
thereby disrupting the market for stolen automobiles and parts.27 Ayres and
Levitt suggest that LoJack is effective as a deterrent precisely because car
thieves do not know which cars have the device installed (owners are prohibited by contract from advertising that they use the device). But this
means that LoJack users capture only a small fraction (roughly ten percent)
of the overall societal benefit of installing the device, suggesting that the
device is underutilized from a social point of view.29
To summarize, displacement is likely to occur when victims are homogeneous in the eyes of the criminal, only some victims take precautions, and
the criminal can observe precaution-taking, so that he or she can easily
switch to more vulnerable targets.30 In theory, these conditions will often be
met. Indeed, empirical scholarship has identified several types of precautions that tend to displace crime, rather than reduce it.'

25.

Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Vic-

tim Precaution: An EmpiricalAnalysis of LoJack, 113 Q.J. ECON. 43 (1998).
26.

Id. at 45-46 (finding that annually one car theft is deterred for every three LoJack de-

vices that are installed).

27.

Id.

28.

Id. at 45 n.4.

29. Id. at 47. Users pay a one-time fee of $600 for the LoJack device, but they capture only
$200 of the $1,500 in annual benefits to society from using the device. Id. at 74.
30. In addition, the criminal also must not have to incur significant costs in switching from
one target to the next. Switching costs include any cost a criminal incurs in changing targets-the
cost of locating a new target, traveling to it, reformulating plans, and so on.

31. One study, for example, found that citizens who marked their property-and advertised
that fact-displaced burglaries onto other households. Thomas Gabor, The Crime Displacement
Hypothesis: An EmpiricalExamination, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 390 (1981). The use of door locks,
which can be discovered with relative ease, seems to have the same effect. Terance D. Miethe, Citizen-Based Crime Control Activity and Victimization Risks: An Examination of Displacement and
Free-RiderEffects, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 419 (1991). Likewise, the installation of steering column locks
on newer cars appears to displace crime onto older vehicles without the device. P. MAYHEW ET AL.,
HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY No. 34, CRIME AS OPPORTUNITY 9-20 (1976).

For reviews of the early empirical scholarship on crime displacement, see Ren6 B.P. Hesseling,
Displacement:A Review of the EmpiricalLiterature, 3 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 197-230 (Ronald
V. Clarke ed., 1994) and John E. Eck, The Threat of Crime Displacement, 15 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTs 527-46 (1993).
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C. Why DisplacementIs ConsideredNecessarily Wasteful

The threat of crime displacement has sparked more concern than any
other externality associated

with private precautions. Displacement is

thought to lack any socially redeeming value. To see why, consider the
worst-case scenario called total displacement-that is, every crime that is
prevented against a precaution-taker is instead committed against someone

else; the overall crime rate is left unchanged. The losses suffered by the victims of displaced crimes cancel out the gains reaped by precaution-takers.
All the while, precaution-takers have spent resources, but to no societal
benefit. The conventional wisdom thus concludes that precautions that do
nothing but shift crime are necessarily wasteful, from a social point of

view. No level of precaution-taking is socially desirable.
Essential to this conclusion is the assumption that the societal cost of
any given crime is the same across all cases and victims." This assumption

has an empirical foundation (though as argued below in Part II, it is ultimately mistaken). In practice, the law strives to define and punish each
offense according to the harm done in that case. As the Supreme Court

noted in Payne v. Tennessee, a decision upholding the use of victim-impact
evidence at the capital sentencing stage of a criminal case, "the assessment
of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged has understandably

been

an important concern of the criminal

law, both in

determining the elements of the offense and in determining the appropriate
punishment."34 Thus, acts that inflict more serious harms are graded as more

32.

E.g., Geoffrey C. Barnes, Defining and Optimizing Displacement, in CRIME AND PLACE

95, 96-97 (John E. Eck & David Weisburd eds., 1995) ("Because no overall reduction in offending
is produced, displacement would seem to eliminate completely any benefits that the prevention of
crime may bring."); Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for
PrivatePrecautionsagainst Crime, 11 J.L. ECoN. & ORG. 435, 439 (1995) ("If the victim's precautions only lead offenders to commit their acts against other victims, there is a private benefit to
precautions that is not translated into social gain.").
Some have recognized the obvious point that crime type displacement (as opposed to victim
displacement) may be beneficial; in other words, when a precaution prevents one type of crimesay, carjacking-but also increases another, legally distinct, and less serious type of crime-say,
pick-pocketing-society may benefit. See, e.g., Niall Hamilton-Smith, Anticipated Consequences:
Developing a Strategy for the Targeted Measurement of Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits, in
EVALUATION FOR CRIME PREVENTION 11 (Nick Tilley ed., 2002). By contrast, this Article builds the
case that, even under the most pessimistic scenario-when the displaced crime is identical to the
one originally planned, from the law's perspective-displacement may be beneficial.
33.

For examples of scholarship stating the assumption explicitly, see Dhammika Dharma-

&

pala & Nuno Garoupa, Penalty Enhancementfor Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis, 6 AM. L.

EcON. REV. 185, 187 (2004) ("We begin with the assumption that the harm to an individual victim
from a hate crime is identical to that from an equivalent non-hate crime."); Koo Hui-Wen & I.P.L.
Png, Private Security: Deterrent or Diversion?, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 87, 88 (1994) (model
assumes victims value property identically); Shavell, supra note 6, at 126 (model assumes all victims are risk neutral and makes no allowance for possibility that victims will value property
differently). But see Ayres & Levitt, supra note 25, at 71 (acknowledging that their study understates
the total social benefits of LoJack by focusing exclusively on its reduction in the overall car theft
rate and ignoring the additional benefit that occurs when some car thefts are shifted onto older vehicles, which are less likely to carry the device).

34.

501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991).
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serious crimes than are acts inflicting less serious harms. 5 Manslaughter,
which involves the death of a human being, is distinguished from aggravated
assault, a felony that involves the infliction of serious bodily injury on another; aggravated assault is likewise distinguished from simple assault, a
misdemeanor which involves mere "bodily injury" to another; and so on.36
Criminal acts that inflict more serious harms are also punished more sternly.
Under the federal sentencing guidelines, for example, the theft of $500,000
incurs a higher sanction (thirty-three to forty-one months) than does the
theft of, say, $100,000 (fifteen to twenty-one months)." The sanction imposed in each case corresponds to the harm inflicted, even though both

offenses may be considered the same crime (say, grand larceny).
Because the law goes to such great lengths to define and punish crime according to the harm done, many scholars of crime prevention seem to assume
that if we were to compare two separate incidents involving the same crime
(and carrying the same sentence), they would necessarily also involve the
same amount of harm. 39 For example, an aggravated assault upon victim A

would involve the same amount of harm-and hence, the same societal costas an aggravated assault upon victim B. It follows that the only way to reduce
the societal cost of crime is to reduce the incidence of crime. Shifting crime

from A to B has no societal benefit. A precaution that shifts an aggravated
assault from A to B cannot reduce the societal cost of the crime; the gain to A
is offset exactly by the loss to B. But since precaution-taking is a costly activ-

ity-individuals must expend resources (money, time, energy, etc.) to protect
themselves-it follows that precautions that only displace crime are necessarily wasteful. Individuals expend resources just to transfer a loss, without
reducing the size of the loss, which is what economists refer to as rent-

seeking.4 Since the private benefit exceeds the societal benefit (which is, in
this case, zero), such precautions will be oversupplied by the market; indeed,

if we are talking about precautions that do nothing but displace crime (The
35.
E.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.10D (3d ed. 2001). See
generally Paul H. Robinson, A FunctionalAnalysis of the Criminal law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 857
(1994) (discussing the "grading function" of the criminal law).

36. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (defining crime of simple assault), with id.
§ 211.1(2) (defining crime of aggravated assault). Under the MPC, simple assault is graded as a
misdemeanor, whereas aggravated assault is graded as a felony in the second or third degree. Id.
37.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1, 5.A (2005). The sentences are calculated for a defendant with a criminal history category of I.
38.
The sentencing stage only adds precision if it is based on a real offense, as opposed to a
charge offense system. The real offense system would impose sanctions based on factors other than
the crime elements charged and proved by the prosecution at trial. David Yellen, Reforming the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines'MisguidedApproachto Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REv.
267, 268-69 (2005). Most sentencing schemes embody some features of a real offense system, so
that sentencing decisions supply at least some additional information about the total amount of harm

that was inflicted in individual cases, above and beyond that provided by grading decisions alone.
See id.
39.

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 33.

40.
See Tullock, supra note 8. Rent-seeking is, by definition, wasteful, since it involves the
investment of resources that do not increase the overall utility or well-being of society. See generally
GORDON TULLOCK, RENT SEEKING (1993).
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Club, for example), from a social point of view, the optimal level of precaution-taking is zero, according to the conventional wisdom.
Although scholars sometimes disagree over the degree to which specific
precautions displace crime, they agree that when it occurs, displacement always poses a problem-that it always detracts from the social utility of
precautions. 4 ' Ayres and Levitt, for example, warn that precautions that result

in total displacement represent a "pure deadweight loss" to society.42 Professors Cooter and Ulen, in their seminal Law and Economics text, summarize
the prevailing view, in discussing the utility of taking a precaution against
burglary: "Installing [a] lock has little social value if it prevents the burglary
of [one] house by causing a burglar to rob the house next door. Call this effect
redistributingcrime. Redistributingcrime has no socialbenefit." 4
To summarize, the conventional wisdom is that precautions that merely
shift crime onto other victims lack any socially redeeming value. The conventional wisdom suggests that when a precaution changes only the identity
of the victim, and not the type of crime that is committed, it does not reduce
the societal costs of the crime-it only redistributes them. And since there is
no social gain to taking the precaution, i.e., no reduction in crime, the resources spent taking the precaution are entirely wasted.44 As discussed
below, this damning conclusion has important implications for how the law
should respond to precaution-taking.
D. The Impact of Displacement on Policy Discourse

Concerns over crime displacement play a central role in debates over
both public and private crime-control strategies.4 ' The legal academy and
policy makers adhere to the notion that private precautions are socially
beneficial, if, and only if, they reduce crime. Success in the war on crimeboth public and private-is thus often judged by the extent to which anticrime
measures deter, rather than displace, crime. 6 Displacement is portrayed as a
41.
See sources cited supra note 32; see also Dharmapala & Garoupa, supra note 33, at 200
(noting that "aggregate expenditures on avoidance activities represent a social loss ... as displacement generates no social benefit" (emphasis added)); id. at 187 (noting that "avoidance activities
merely displace hate crimes onto other [victims] and are thus socially wasteful"); JOHN R. Lorr,
JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME 92 (1998) ("In the extreme, if the entire reduction in crime from concealed-handgun laws was simply transferred to other areas, society as a whole would be no better off
with these laws, even if individual jurisdictions benefited.") (emphasis added); NALEBUFF & AYRES,

supra note 22, at 23 ("[I]f you buy The Club to deter auto theft and all this action does is send the
thief to the next car, then the price of The Club doesn't reflect its value to society (which is zero).")

(emphasis added).
42.

Ayres & Levitt, supra note 25, at 76.

43.

CooTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 476 (second emphasis added).

By contrast, precautions that reduce crime may be socially valuable, even if they gener44.
ate other types of externalities, such as nuisances; citizens will take too many precautions, since they
do not internalize the full cost of them, but at least some level of precaution-taking of this sort may

be socially desirable.
45.

See sources cited supra note 18.

46.
E.g., Thomas Gabor, Crime Displacement and Situational Prevention: Toward the Development of Some Principles, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT: THE OTHER SIDE OF PREVENTION 71, 95
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"frustrating side effect" 47-the "Achilles heel of situational crime prevention,"4 8 and is often raised as a key objection to many types of crime-control
strategies.49 Some commentators have even claimed that concerns over crime
displacement have had a paralyzing effect on campaigns to enact crimecontrol measures that are not aimed at the underlying causes of crime, such
as poverty.
Consider, for example, the debate over gated communities. Gating is one
of the most widespread types of private precaution used today. Gated com-

'

munities are neighborhoods that install locked gates and hire security
patrols-at private expense-to prevent criminals from gaining access to
residents. As of 2003, there were nearly seven million households located in
gated communities, or nearly seven percent of all households in the country.5
The problem with such communities, some scholars assert, is that "gating
always diverts crime to other communities."52 Burglars and other wrongdoers
who are frustrated in their attempts to enter secure, gated communities simply prey upon more vulnerable communities instead. The money spent to
fortify one neighborhood is thus of little value to society at large.
In response to concerns over the displacement of crime across neighborhoods, some local governments have refused to allow real estate developers

to control access to new or existing communities." In other words, city
(Robert P. McNamara ed., 1994) ("The resolution of the displacement issue, without a doubt, is an
essential part of ascertaining the feasibility of situational crime prevention programs."); Arthur J.
Lurigio & Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Evaluation Research in Community Crime Prevention: A Critical

Look at the Field, in

CRIME DISPLACEMENT: THE OTHER SIDE OF PREVENTION,

supra at 11, 32

("[T]he collective or ultimate benefits of an anticrime strategy remain dubious unless displacement
effects can be dismissed."); Emma Short & Jason Ditton, Seen and Now Heard: Talking to the Targets of Open Street CCTV, 38 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 404, 405 (1998) (arguing that CCTV "cannot
be counted as a success until it can be demonstrated that ... apparently saved crimes have not sim-

ply been displaced elsewhere"); Gordon Trasler, Situational Crime Contml and Rational Choice: A
Critique, in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREvENTION: FROM THEORY INTO PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 17,
18 ("Whether measures for the environmental control of crime ... are to be counted as a success
depends . . . on whether they have succeeded in reducing the incidence of [crime in the target area
and on] whether displacement has occurred.").

47. Robert Barr & Ken Pease, Crime Placement, Displacement, and Deflection, in 12 CRIME
& JUST. 277, 278 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1990).
48.

Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Value for Money? A Review of the Costs and
BRrr. J. CRIMINOLOGY 345, 347 (1999).

Benefits of SituationalCrime Prevention, 39

49.
See, e.g., Cornish & Clarke, supra note 18, at 1-3 (noting that displacement is often a
"crucial objection to situational crime prevention approaches").
Id. Although they agree with the notion that displacement is undesirable, some crimi50.
nologists have been dismayed by the reaction to it because they believe that displacement is not as
common as others (particularly economists) have suggested. See, e.g., Barr & Pease, supra note 47,
at 280-82 (arguing that displacement is not the inevitable result of crime prevention measures).
51.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2003

tbl.

2-8, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs03/tab28.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).

52. Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Gated Communities and the Economic Geography of Crime, 46 J. URB. ECON. 80, 80 (1999) (emphasis added).
53.

EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES

IN THE UNITED STATES 157 (1997) (noting, for example, that the Plano, Texas, city council refused
to grant permission to install gates around a particular neighborhood in part out of concerns that
doing so would only displace crime onto other non-gated communities); see also Bob Greene, The
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governments are blocking private efforts to control crime in part out of the
belief that the efforts have no social utility, that they merely redistribute
crime from one neighborhood to the next, and do not reduce its impact on
the overall community. Similar concerns regarding displacement of crime
have appeared in debates over the regulation of myriad other precautions as
well, ranging from the installation of advanced closed circuit television
(CCTV) cameras to more traditional programs like the neighborhood
watch. 4

In short, concerns over displacement have spilled over from the academy
into policy discourse. Policy-makers have taken their cue from the academy,
seeking to curtail (or even block) the use of precautions that displace crime,
on the theory that such precautions are not in the public interest. Unfortu-

nately, as the next two Parts argue, we may be condemning precautions that
are socially desirable. This Article contends that the concerns over displacement may be misguided, not because displacement never occurs-it
clearly does-but because displacement may not be inherently harmful after
all." The next two Parts explain why the existing case against displacement
is flawed. Part II shows that the conventional wisdom rests upon an assumption that is both empirically and theoretically unsound. Part III offers a new
theory of beneficial displacement.
II. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN LAW AND HARMS

This Part challenges the assumption behind the conventional wisdom regarding crime displacement, namely, that separate violations of the same
criminal code necessarily cause identical amounts of harm, and thus, that we
can assess the societal benefit of any precaution by determining whether it
reduces the number of crimes of a given type (e.g., aggravated assault) that
are committed. Conventional wisdom says, for example, that displacing an
Elusive Sense of Community Behind the Gates, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 20, 1995, at Cl (noting that a city
planner in San Diego argued against allowing more gated communities, saying that "'the walling off
of developments or neighborhoods may only serve to temporarily displace crime from one area to
another'").

54. See, e.g., Tracey Sagar, Street Watch: Concept and Practice: Civilian Participation in
Street Prostitution Control, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 98, 103 (2005) (noting that citizens protested
a government-sponsored neighborhood watch program that had displaced prostitution and other

crimes into different neighborhoods); Jessica Gresko & Natasha Lee, Cameras on Watch Across
L.A., L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at B1 (reporting the ACLU's criticism of the installation of thousands of security cameras across southern California, claiming the cameras do not deter, but only
displace, crime); Roy Wood, Cameras to Scan Crime Hot Spots, CINCINNATI PosT, July 2, 2005, at

A12 (quoting a city official urging Cincinnati not to install CCTV cameras, on the belief that such
cameras only displace crime).
It is also possible that communities will encourage private precaution-taking that merely displaces crime-as long as it displaces it onto other communities. See Doron Teichman, The Market
for Criminal Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1843-57 (2005) (suggesting that states have adopted
various crime-control programs to displace crime onto other states or communities, including three
strikes laws and sex offender registries).

55. As suggested in the Conclusion, there may be other reasons to condemn precautiontaking that merely shifts crime-for example, certain segments of society may end up bearing a
disproportionate share of the crime burden-but this Article focuses on the economic argument
against displacement that has been the focal point of the debate over private precautions.
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aggravated assault from one victim to the next does not change the harm to
society; the law's treatment of the two cases (e.g., labeling each an "aggravated assault") implies that the societal harms are identical.
This Part argues that the way the law actually grades and punishes crime
is a poor proxy for the total harm done in any individual case. To begin, the
law ignores some types of harm altogether, such as the loss of sentimental
value, for purposes of grading and punishing crime. In addition, by attempting to sort every offense into one of a finite number of crime categories
(e.g., petty larceny or grand larceny), the law, in effect, ignores wide disparities in the amount of harm caused in individual cases5 6 In short, just because

the law treats two cases identically does not mean that they necessarily
caused identical amounts of harm. Victims are heterogeneous; the law systematically understates the total harm suffered by so-called eggshell victims.
Moreover, given that criminals do not always gain in direct proportion to
what their victims lose, it is theoretically possible to reduce the total harm
suffered by crime victims without reducing the payoff or incentive to commit crime. It is thus mistaken to conclude that shifting crime from one
victim to another cannot affect the societal cost of the crime. As long as
crime is displaced onto victims who are harmed relatively less, as the theory

developed in Part III suggests will happen, precautions may reduce the societal cost of crime, even if they do not reduce the crime rate.
A. The Law Ignores Some Harms
One reason the total harm caused by a given crime may vary across in-

dividual cases is that the law simply ignores some types of harm for
purposes of grading and punishing offenses. In grading and punishing offenses, the law focuses almost exclusively on foreseeable, objectively
verifiable harms, such as the market value of stolen property. The law disregards other types of harms, such as the destruction of sentimental value, for
two main reasons. First, courts have difficulty measuring or even verifying

some harms ex post (that is, after the crime was committed). 7 Consider, for
example, how a court might assess the sentimental value of stolen property
in grading a theft offense. The court would have to rely almost exclusively
upon the victim's testimony, which can be unreliable. A victim may
56.
This Article assumes, without loss of generality, that the law is enforced flawlessly.
Cases causing different levels of harm are treated alike not because of mistakes made by those who
apply the law (the police, prosecutors, judges, etc.), but because of the way the law is written.

57.

Cf United States v. Bae, 250 F.3d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (lost profits are an "undesir-

able measure of loss" in fraud cases, in part, because they are difficult for courts to ascertain);

People v. Dyer, 403 N.W.2d 84, 86 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting that one of the reasons subjective value is not considered in larceny cases is that it cannot easily be verified); RICHARD A.
POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 235 (2001) (doubting the ability of courts to identify individual crimes inflicting special harms, such as hate crimes).
A related concern is that courts would be overwhelmed if required to consider more than a
"reasonably small number of discrete harm categories" in making grading and sentencing decisions.
FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 56 (1999) (at-

tempting to explain why the law does not evaluate ex post many types of harms experienced by

victims).
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overstate his loss to exact revenge on the wrongdoer or may simply struggle
to monetize-not to mention articulate-the true extent of his loss.58 Ignoring the loss of sentimental value and certain other harms is thus a secondbest solution. The law will treat some offenses too leniently, but it may still
be less arbitrary and capricious than if it based grading and sentencing decisions on difficult-to-measure harms. Second, some harms are not
foreseeable to the criminal ex ante (that is, at the time the crime was committed). For example, a thief may not know that the person she is about to
rob has an "eggshell skull" and will be badly injured in the ensuing confrontation. Punishing the robber for having caused an unforeseeable amount of
harm will not enhance the deterrent effect of the law; by definition, the robber did not expect her crime to trigger the additional sanction." Moreover,
punishing criminals for inflicting unforeseeable harms does not comport
with some notions of moral culpability.`
In short, the law grades and punishes offenses based on only part-the
easily measured and anticipated part-of the harm done in any case. The
problem with this approach is that the total harm caused by two legally
"identical" offenses-two grand larcenies involving $100,000 (market
value) in property, for example-may differ considerably. The amount of
objectively verifiable and foreseeable harm is not a good proxy for the total
harms caused by an offense. The types of harm the law does consider for
grading and sentencing purposes (e.g., pecuniary losses) are not necessarily
linked to the harms the law ignores (e.g., the destruction of sentimental
value): property worth $1,000 on the market, for example, may carry more
or less sentimental value than property worth $1,000,000 on the market. It
follows that shifting crime-even the same crime, as defined by the legal
code-from one victim to another may reduce the societal costs of crime,
because some victims of the crime suffer relatively less (they lose less sentimental value, and so on). The next three Sections discuss in greater detail
some of the harms that are ignored by the law in both defining and punishing crime, thereby demonstrating the law's limited usefulness as a proxy of
the total harm suffered in individual cases.6

58.

See, e.g., Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28

AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (1990) (discussing victim-impact statements); Janice Nadler & Mary R.
Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (2003).

59. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 365-66 (1994).
60.

See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique on Emphasis on

the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974). See also 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.3(e) (2d ed. 2003) ("[T]here is no basis for imposing on

a defendant either the label or the sanctions applicable to one who intentionally caused the results
which the defendant fortuitously caused while intending some lesser degree of harm. In short, the
better result when the actual harm exceeds the intended harm is to deal with the actor's conduct in

terms of harm intended.") (citation omitted).
61. The discussion of the harms ignored by the law is not meant to be exhaustive; rather, it
focuses on a handful of important types of harm that often do not correspond to any benefits obtained by criminals-an important distinction, as discussed below in Section II.C.
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1. The Loss of Sentimental Value
People attach sentimental value to a variety of possessions, such as family heirlooms and mementos. Indeed, some possessions are prized more for
their sentimental significance than for their objective value. Nonetheless, the
law ignores sentimental value in grading and punishing crime. For example,
in distinguishing between grand and petty larceny, and in determining the
sentence for crimes of larceny, the law typically calculates the victim's loss
based exclusively upon the market value of the property that was taken.62
Juries may not consider the special value a victim attached to her property,
nor may the victim testify as to such value, in a criminal trial or sentencing

hearing.63 Hence, the theft of, say, a $10,000 wedding ring is treated no differently than the theft of any other $10,000 piece of jewelry.
It is easy to see why-if we ignore sentimental value-society has no
reason to care whether a thief steals property of identical market value from
victim A or from victim B. Since either victim could replace the property,

the loss incurred by the theft is equal to the item's replacement cost, which
is presumptively identical for each victim. Suppose, for example, that A and
B each own a similar ring valued at $10,000 on the market, and that a thief
is plotting to steal one of the rings. Society gains nothing if B takes a precaution that displaces the crime onto A; even if B values her ring at, say,
$30,000, and A values her ring at only $10,000, the loss is the same for both
victims, since either could restore the lost value (whether $10,000 or

$30,000) by purchasing a new ring for $10,000 on the market.
When a victim loses property to which she attaches sentimental value,
however, the replacement cost no longer caps her loss from the crime. The

sentimental value is destroyed by the theft, for it is not transferred to the
thief and it cannot be restored by replacing the property. Suppose, for example, that two-thirds of the value B attaches to her ring ($20,000) represents
"sentimental value." Society now has a reason to prefer that the thief take

A's ring instead of B's-B stands to lose $20,000 more from this crimeeven though the law would treat the two thefts identically.

Indeed, the same problem arises when an owner values her property at
more than its replacement cost and cannot afford to replace it if it is stolen.

Suppose, for example, that a thief steals a car from B, who needs the car to
commute to work, run errands, and so on. The car has a market value of

$10,000, but B would gladly pay $30,000 for it or any similar vehicle. If B
can afford to replace the car, the loss from this theft is only $10,000, i.e., the
price of a comparable car on the market. If, however,' B does not have car

62. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. (n.3(C)(i)) (2005) (loss is
determined by "fair market value" of property taken); id. at cmt. 3(A)(iii) (pecuniary harm excludes
"emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other non-economic harm"); see also 50 AM. JUR. 2D
Larceny § 50 (2001) (fair market value used to grade larceny offenses).
63. E.g., Michigan v. Gilbert, 128 N.W. 756 (Mich. 1910) (juries barred from considering
sentimental value); United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (owner may not
testify regarding subjective value of property); see also 50 AM. JUR. 2D Larceny § 50 (2001).
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theft insurance and is otherwise too poor to afford to buy another car, her
loss (and by aggregation, society's) is $30,000."
2. Search Costs
When property is stolen or destroyed, the owner may seek to replace it.
In so doing, she will incur a variety of costs in addition to the cost of the
item itself, such as the time spent finding a replacement or negotiating with
the seller.65 Suppose that B, the victim of a car theft in the previous hypothetical, can afford to replace her stolen car for $10,000. In addition to
paying $10,000 to the seller, however, B must also spend twenty hours of
her time finding a new car-researching, traveling, negotiating, filling out
forms, and so on-time which she values at $100 per hour. The value of B's
time, an additional $2,000, should be considered as part of the total cost of
the car theft; after all, but for the theft, B would have spent her time doing
something else she enjoyed. Yet, with few exceptions, the law ignores search
costs in grading and punishing crime.66 As explained above in Section A.1,
the law grades and punishes theft offenses based on the fair market value of
the property that was stolen; fair market value represents the price a reasonable buyer would pay to a reasonable seller, and does not include any costs
the buyer incurred in finding the item (nor any sentimental value the buyer
or seller attaches to it).67
Ignoring search costs in defining and punishing crime is problematic.
Search costs vary, sometimes considerably, for different victims of the same
crime. For one thing, some victims are more knowledgeable about the mar-

ket and thus do not have to spend as much time and effort to find a
replacement for property that is stolen or damaged. Suppose that a thief
64.
Cf JACK GOLDSMITH & SHARON S. GOLDSMITH, CRIME AND THE ELDERLY 2 (1976)
("The loss of a relatively few dollars-although it might be classified by authorities as a petty
crime-can have a very dramatic or tragic effect on the life of an older person who is without finan-

cial resources to replace money needed for food, medicine, rent, and other necessities.").

65.

For a discussion of search costs, see P. Diamond, Search Theory, in 4 THE NEW PAL-

GRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 273 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). Generally, Diamond and
the many scholars who have analyzed his work have not examined situations in which search costs

vary across consumers-an essential point in this Section. For a notable exception, however, see Hal
R. Varian, A Model of Sales, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 651 (1980) (presenting a model in which consumers face different costs of acquiring information).
66.

See, e.g., United States v. Izydore, 167 F.3d 213, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that

loss is limited to the value of the property taken and does not include consequential damages, such
as $210,157 in trustee's fees that were incurred as a result of defendant's fraud). The Sentencing

Guidelines do provide for an exception in product substitution and procurement fraud cases. USSG
§ 2B1.1, cmt. (n.3(A)(v)(I)) (loss in product substitution cases includes "reasonably foreseeable
costs of making substitute transactions"); id. at cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II) (loss in procurement fraud cases
includes "administrative costs . .. of repeating or correcting the procurement action affected").
67.
It is puzzling why the law has neglected search and other replacement costs, but it may
have something to do with the fact that-like the loss of sentimental value-such consequential
damages are both difficult to quantity and often vary for reasons that have no bearing on the criminal's
culpability. In addition, in some cases, search and replacement costs will be small in comparison to the

value of the property. Cf United States v. Silver, 245 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that
search and replacement costs are often "substantial" in procurement fraud and product substitution
cases-the only instances in which the Guidelines take them into consideration).

November 20061

"Eggshell" Victims

325

steals an identical camera from two different victims, A and B. B is visiting
town on vacation, whereas A is a long-time resident. Comparing these two

victims, it seems reasonable to expect that it will take A less time to replace
his camera. A is probably already familiar with local shops, knows where
they are located, the brands they stock, and so on. B, on the other hand, will
have to start from scratch; before he makes his purchase, he will need to
locate a suitable seller, and that takes time.
The value of the time spent finding a suitable replacement may also vary
by victim. To replace an item, a victim must forego other opportunities, such

as watching a movie or reading a good book; in economics terms, the value of
these foregone opportunities represents the victim's opportunity cost of time.68

Suppose B, our hapless vacationer, is familiar with the camera shops in the
community. Thus, it may take him no longer than A to obtain a new camera.

Nonetheless, B may value his time more than A, given that he is on vacation.
The opportunities that B must forego (seeing new sights, visiting distant
friends, and so on) may be worth more than the opportunities that A will sacrifice (watching television, spending an evening with co-workers, and so on) to
replace the camera. Hence, the theft of B's camera is more costly-to society,
and not just to B-than the theft of A's camera, even though the cameras

themselves are identical and the law would treat the two thefts identically.
There is a third type of search cost associated with replacing a good that
may vary among potential victims: the cost of negotiating.69 This refers not

to the cost of becoming informed or the opportunity cost of time, but to the
dislike of the negotiating process itself. Simply put, some buyers dislike
dealing with sellers. For example, a J.D. Power & Associates survey in 1992
found that sixty-eight percent of car buyers "dread" the process of buying a
new car.

That is, many consumers would gladly pay to avoid the negotia-

tion process because it makes them uncomfortable. And it is safe to say that
some consumers "dread" negotiating more than others do. For example, one
study found that women were willing to pay much more ($1,350) compared
to men ($666) to avoid negotiating over the purchase of a car." The amount
someone would be willing to pay to avoid negotiations may represent the

disutility of negotiations. The women in the aforementioned study found car
buying particularly painful because they felt mistreated by car dealerships;
by contrast, some men actually enjoyed the process, viewing it as a game.72

68.
See James M. Buchanan, Opportunity Costs and Legal Institutions, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 710 (Peter Newman ed., 1998), for a discussion
of the concept of opportunity costs.

69. See generally Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING
Sci. 199 (1985) (introducing the concept of transaction utility).
70.

One-Price Car Dealers Winning Favor, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 1, 1992, at B5.

71.
LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003). The authors claim that society imposes gender-based standards of behavior;
women are supposed to be modest and unselfish, and if they ask for things, they are perceived as "pushy"
or worse. Hence, they say, many women struggle with "intense anxiety" in negotiations. Id. at 11.
72.
See id. at 116; see also Uri Gneezy et al., Performance in Competitive Environments:
Gender Differences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1049, 1071 (2003) (suggesting that gender differences in
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It follows that the theft of an item from a person who dislikes negotiating,
for whatever reason, would cost more to society than the theft of an identical
item from a person who enjoys the bargaining process, or at least does not
mind it.
In short, when victims of crime must replace some good that has been
stolen or destroyed, their costs are likely to vary, even if the good itself does
not. Differences in search costs will not be reflected by the way the law
treats cases. The loss, according to the law, is equal to the fair market value
of the property. Thus, two thefts may be treated identically by the law, even
though one imposed much higher search costs on the victim-and was thus
more harmful to society-than did the other.
3. UnforeseeableHarms
Crimes often cause more harm than anticipated by the perpetrator. Suppose, for example, that X robs a convenience store, expecting to do no harm
to the store clerk; the clerk, however, has heart disease, suffers a massive
heart attack because of the shock, and dies. Or suppose X snatches a purse
and finds, much to his surprise, that it contains a $100,000 diamond ring,
and not just the small bills he was expecting.
The law's approach to grading and punishing offenses that cause unforeseeable harms varies by jurisdiction." One approach taken by many
jurisdictions is to hold a defendant accountable for all the harms caused by
his offense, foreseeable or not." In the first hypothetical above, X is guilty
of felony-murder, even if he neither intended nor could have foreseen that
the store clerk would die in the course of the robbery.75 Similarly, in the second hypothetical, X is guilty of felonious theft, and not just petty theft (the

performance in competitive tournaments may be attributable to differences in perceptions of competence, which are influenced by societal norms).
73..

For purposes of this Article, "unforeseeable harm" includes any amount of harm that was

greater than the amount the criminal knew, or should have known, would result at the time the offense was committed, or any harm that was different in kind from what the criminal knew, or should
have known, would result.

74.

This is analogous to the rule in torts that an injurer takes the victim as she finds him.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

75.

§ 461

(1965).

See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 500 A.2d 676, 683 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (hotel clerk died

of heart attack two hours after four defendants, who were unarmed, handed her a note demanding

cash; court upholds felony-murder conviction); see also United States v. Mitchell, 366 F.3d 376, 379
(5th Cir. 2004) (bank customer suffered stroke during robbery; court upholds six-level enhancement
to defendant's base offense level under federal sentencing guidelines, even though the injury was

"unforeseeable"). For a discussion of the ways in the which the criminal law does-or does nothold defendants accountable for unforeseeable harms, see DRESSLER, supra note 35, § 14.03, and 1

LAFAvE, supra note 60, § 6.4(f)(7).
The felony-murder rule provides that a death that results from the commission of a felony con-

stitutes murder. The death need not have been foreseeable, though most jurisdictions limit
application of the felony-murder rule to felonies that are "inherently or foreseeably dangerous" to
human life. Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, What Feloniesare Inherently or ForeseeablyDangerousto

Human Life for Purposesof Felony-MurderDoctrine, 50 A.L.R.3D 397 (1973).
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charge normally applied to purse snatchings), even though he had no prior
knowledge of the contents of the purse.
Not surprisingly, this first approach has generated considerable controversy. As discussed above, some critics argue that unforeseeable harms have
no bearing on a defendant's moral culpability." They say a defendant should
not be condemned or punished for what amounts to sheer "bad luck." Utilitarians argue as well that taking unforeseeable harms into consideration in
grading and punishing an offense does not enhance deterrence.78
For these reasons, some jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code
(MPC) approach and disregard at least some unforeseeable harms in grading
and sentencing decisions.79 Under the MPC, for example, a defendant is
guilty of an aggravated assault if he "purposely, knowingly, or recklessly"
causes "serious bodily injury" to another.80 If the defendant intended to
cause only "bodily injury," he is guilty of simple assault, even if the injury
he inflicted was, in fact, "serious." Suppose that X shoves B; unbeknownst
to X, B has an "eggshell skull" and suffers permanent brain damage in the
assault. X is guilty of simple assault, and not aggravated assault, as long as
he did not "purposely, knowingly or recklessly" cause B's brain damage.

76.

See, e.g., State v. Combariati, 452 A.2d 710, 713 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).

77.

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.

78.

See supra note 59 and accompanying text.

79.

The MPC accomplishes this by including a mens rea requirement for every element of an

offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1962) ("[A] person is not guilty of an offense unless he
acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each
material element of the offense"). See DRESSLER, supra note 35, § 14.04, for a discussion of the
MPC's approach to unforeseeable harms.

80.
(1)

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 211.1

(1962):

Simple Assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(a)

attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to

other....

an-

Simple assault is a misdemeanor ....
(2)

Aggravated Assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(a)

attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely,
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life ....

Aggravated assault under paragraph (a) is a felony of the second degree ....

See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-202(1) (2005) ("A person commits the offense of aggravated
assault if the person purposely or knowingly causes serious bodily injury to another."); id. § 45-2101(35) (person acts "knowingly" if the person is "aware that it is highly probable that the result
will be caused by the person's conduct").

81.

Cf. State v. Battle, 507 A.2d 297, 299 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (reversing convic-

tion for aggravated assault because defendant lacked the "intent, plan, design or purpose" to inflict

serious bodily harm on elderly woman who was thrown to the ground in course of purse snatching);
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 817 A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (reversing conviction for aggravated assault because defendant's accomplice had not intended to inflict serious bodily injury when
he struck the victim in the back with a gun during the course of a robbery); see also 6 AM. JUR. 2D
Assault and Battery § 36 (1999) ("Generally, in order to support a finding of aggravated assault, it
must be proved that there was an intentional infliction of injury by the defendant ... or that the

Michigan Law Review

328

[Vol.

105:307

Similarly, in calculating the victim's loss for purposes of sentencing larceny
offenses, the federal sentencing guidelines instruct courts to include only
"reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm," that is, "harm that the defendant
knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a
potential result of the offense."" Suppose that X steals $10,000 in cash from
B; although X did not know it at the time, B was planning to invest this
money in a particular security that quickly tripled in value. In sentencing

this crime, the court will ignore the fact that, but for X's crime, B would
have made a $20,000 profit on the stock market.
The main insight of this Section is that when the law ignores unforeseeable harms-as it clearly does, in many instances-the law is not an
accurate proxy for the total harm actually caused in individual cases. If we
compare a "simple assault" against B to a "simple assault" against A, for
example, we may find that B suffered more harm than A, even though the
law graded and punished the offenses identically. To be sure, it may be fair to
ignore B's extraordinary harms for purposes of grading and sentencing the
offense, but it is misleading to ignore such harms when evaluating victim precautions against crime. As discussed in Part III below, victims surely know
more-than criminals ex ante, or courts ex post-about the losses they would
suffer from crime. Thus, eggshell victims (like B), who usually know they
stand to lose much more from crime, may take more precautions against it. It
follows that, even if an eggshell victim takes a precaution that only displaces
a crime onto another victim, society still gains something in the process.
B. The Law Ignores Variances in the Degree of Harm

The law ignores some types of harm altogether; the loss of sentimental
value, the costs a victim incurs to replace property, and any harms that were
not foreseeable at the time an offense was committed, play no (or very little)

role in grading and punishing offenses. Still, crimes are graded according to
other harmful results, such as pecuniary loss, physical injury, or psychologi-

cal trauma, and the sentence imposed is often linked to such harms.
defendant committed an act which is productive of violence likely to result in the destruction of
life.") (citations omitted).

82.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. (n.3(A)(iv)) (2005). The foresee-

ability of the harm is also an important consideration in deciding upon the extent of an upward
departure on account of death, physical injury, or extreme psychological injury to the victim. Id.
§ 5K2.1-.3 (court should consider whether such injury was "intended or knowingly risked").

83.

See id. § 2B 1.1, cmt. 3(D)(i) (loss shall not include "[i]nterest of any kind"). Members of

the Federal Sentencing Commission recognize that the "[]loss of the time value of money is, from
an economic point of view, indisputably a 'harm' suffered by the victim of a fraud." Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative
History, 35 IND. L. REv. 5, 54 (2001). Nonetheless, the Commission decided that courts would have
difficulty calculating the time value of money for different victims, and the size of the loss suffered
by a victim would depend on factors-such as the length of time between the offense and sentenc-

ing-beyond the defendant's control. Id. at 56; see also United States v. Bae, 250 F.3d 774 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (basing loss in fraud upon purchase price of stolen lottery tickets rather than their redemption value; tying the sentence to the redemption value of the tickets would result in arbitrary
and capricious sentences).
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Within broad limits, however, the law ignores the exact degree of harm
caused." To illustrate, in most jurisdictions, the theft of $20,000 constitutes
a more serious offense, carrying a longer sentence, than the theft of, say,
$1,000, but it does not necessarily constitute a more serious crime-or trigger a longer sentence-than the theft of $2,000, even though the harm
involved is ten times greater.85 Cases involving a wide range of harmful results are grouped together for grading purposes because the law recognizes
only a limited number of distinct crime types (grand and petty larceny, for
instance), each of which is used to grade individual offenses causing a range
of harmful results.86 Cases are sorted again at sentencing, but the way the

law treats a case remains at best a rough proxy for the total harm suffered by
the victim in that case.

In theory, the law could grade and punish every criminal case according
to the precise amount of harm done in that case. The theft of $1,000 would
be labeled differently and punished slightly more sternly than the theft of
$999, the theft of $999 would be labeled differently and punished slightly
more sternly than the theft of $998, and so on. In such a regime, the law's
treatment of each offense would correspond precisely to the actual harm

caused by each wrongdoer. If we assume-contrary to the discussion above
in Section II.A.-that the law also defined harm expansively to include all
types of harm, then shifting any given crime, as defined by this exhaustive
code, would indeed generate no societal benefit.

In reality, however, an exhaustive legal code that made such fine distinctions between offenses would be nearly impossible to administer." Judges
84.

1 LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 6.3(e); Robinson, supra note 35, at 901-05; Yellen, supra note

85.

See infra note 94 and accompanying text.

86.

The Model Penal Code, for example, sorts crime into only six different grades of seri-

38.

ousness: first, second, or third degree felony, misdemeanor, petty misdemeanor, or violation. MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 1.04, 6.01 (1962).
See generally Douglas A. Berman, DistinguishingOffense Conduct and Offender Char87.
acteristics in Modem Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REv. 277 (2005) (discussing the role of

victim harms, inter alia, in federal sentencing). For example, at the grading stage, an assault involving "serious bodily harm" is labeled an "aggravated assault," and thus distinguished from an assault
involving mere "bodily harm," which is labeled a "simple assault." At the sentencing stage, this
aggravated assault may trigger a longer sentence than another aggravated assault if the serious bodily injury was more costly in the former than in the latter.

It is questionable whether it is even necessary to consider the sorting that takes place at the
sentencing stage. The crime displacement literature assumes that the grade of a crime alone is an
accurate gauge of harms. Thus, for example, empirical studies of crime displacement compare the
number of offenses of a certain type (say, burglaries) that occurred before and after some precaution

was taken, paying no heed to the lengths of the sentences that were imposed (if any) or the amounts
that were taken in the two periods. In any event, the sentence that would be applied to a particular
crime is often not known, given that many crimes are never solved and many defendants never convicted or sentenced. In 2002, for example, only twenty percent of all reported crimes of types monitored
by the FBI resulted in an arrest and charges. FED. BUREAU OF INvESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2002, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/html/web/offleported/02-ncrimeindex0l.html (last visited

Aug. 7, 2006).
88.
In addition, a complex code would be more difficult to understand, thus undermining one
of the primary functions of the criminal law-to inform the public as to what conduct is prohibited.
See Robinson, supra note 35, at 857 (explaining that criminal law performs three functions: it
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would need to master a set of complex legal rules and would need to calculate harms with exactitude in every case, at tremendous cost. Such a system
clearly has its benefits; not only is it more just, but it arguably does a better
job of deterring inefficient crimes as well." Nonetheless, at some point, the
costs of the added complexity clearly outweigh the benefits. Hence, lawmakers must sacrifice a degree of precision to ensure that the criminal code
remains workable in practice. As the United States Sentencing Commission
surmised, "a sentencing system tailored to fit every conceivable wrinkle of
each case can become unworkable"90 ; thus, since it found "no practical way
to combine and account for the large number of diverse harms arising in
different circumstances,"9' the Commission had to strike a balance between
a "broad, simple categorization" model and a "detailed, complex subcategorization" model in formulating the federal sentencing guidelines. 92
In short, two criminal offenses may be graded and punished alike by the
law, even when it is known that they caused different degrees of harm. It is
thus not safe to assume, for example, that an "aggravated assault" on victim
A inflicted the same amount of pecuniary, physical, or psychological harm
as an aggravated assault on victim B, even if identical sentences were imposed in both cases. The following three Sections discuss the role that
pecuniary losses, physical injuries, and psychological injuries play in grading and sentencing crimes. These Sections demonstrate that the amount of
such harms can vary without necessarily affecting the way the law grades or
punishes an offense; the law does not accurately reflect the harms inflicted
in individual cases, and hence, should not be used to judge conclusively the

societal value of precautions that displace crime.
1. PecuniaryLosses

Consider first, the way the law grades and punishes theft offenses according to the magnitude of the pecuniary loss involved. The pecuniary loss
(1) announces rules of conduct; (2) determines whether violation of those rules is blameworthy; and
(3) assesses punishment for blameworthy violations).

89.

Cf. Kaplow, supra note 59, at 312-16 (discussing the tradeoffs between awarding accu-

rate versus average damages in tort cases). To see why, contrast the effects of two approaches to
sentencing. Under the first approach, crimes are punished with a fine equal to the harm done in each
case; under the second approach, crimes are punished with a fine equal to the average harm done
across all cases. Suppose a criminal is plotting three separate offenses that would cause $100, $200,
and $300 in harms, respectively. Assume, for simplicity's sake, that the criminal will be caught and
convicted if he follows through with his plans. A court following the first approach would impose a
fine of $100, $200, or $300 in each case, depending on the harm done; this approach will deter the
criminal from committing an inefficient crime-one for which the criminal's gain is smaller than the
harm-but would not deter efficient crimes. A court following the second approach would impose a

fine of $200 in each case, a fine that equals the average harm done. This approach will not deter all
inefficient offenses; if the criminal would gain more than $200 but less than $300, he will commit
the crime, even though it might cause $300 in damage. But it will deter some efficient crime (assuming, of course, society recognizes such a concept). If the criminal gains more than $100 but less
than $200, he will not commit the offense, even though it might cause only $100 in damage.
90.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs MANUAL §

91.

Id. at cmt. n.4(a).

92.

Id. at cmt. n.3.

1A.1, cmt.

(n.3) (2005).
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suffered in a theft is relatively easy for a court to calculate. The size of the
loss thus plays a central role in determining the grade of the offense, that is,
whether it will be called "grand" or "petty" larceny, as well as the sentence
that attaches to it.93
Nonetheless, thefts involving a wide range of pecuniary harms may be
graded and punished the same way. The reason is that the grade and sentence applied to a theft offense typically correspond to a range of harmful
results (the theft of any amount between $1,000 and $10,000, for instance),
rather than one specific loss figure (the theft of $1,000). In the state of
Texas, for example, the criminal code sorts all theft offenses, involving
losses that range from a few dollars to hundreds of millions of dollars, into
just seven distinct grades, escalating in seriousness from a Class C misdemeanor to a first degree felony as the amount of the pecuniary loss grows.

Table 1 below details the range of harms that are associated with each grade
of theft under Texas law, as well as the sentence that applies.94

TABLE I: GRADING & SENTENCING OF THEFr OFFENSES IN TEXAS
PECUNIARY Loss

GRADE

SENTENCE

< $50

Class C misdemeanor

$500 fine or less

$50-$500

Class B misdemeanor

180 days or less

$501-$1,500

Class A misdemeanor

1 year or less

$1,501-$20,000

State jail felony

180 days to 2 years

$20,001-$100,000

3rd degree felony

2-10 years

$100,001-$200,000

2nd degree felony

2-20 years

> $200,000

1st degree felony

5 years to life

Hence, separate thefts involving significantly different pecuniary harms may
be treated alike under the Texas code. For example, the theft of $2,000 and
the theft of $20,000 are both classified as a "state jail felony," though the
latter clearly involves much greater harm than the former.
To be sure, the amount of pecuniary loss is also considered at sentenc-

ing. But increases in the magnitude of the pecuniary loss do not always
increase the length of the sentence, or at least, they do not increase it in
similar proportion. For instance, the federal sentencing guidelines use pecu-

niary loss to help determine the sentencing range for all larceny offenses.
For a defendant with no criminal history, the theft of, say, $400,000 draws

the same recommended sentencing range-thirty-three to forty-one months
93.

See Frank

O.

Bowman,

m,

Coping With "Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing Fed-

eral Economic Crimes under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 464 (1998).
94.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(1)-(7) (Vernon 2003) (grading theft offenses); id.
§ 12.21-23, .32-35 (sentencing). Other factors, such as the defendant's criminal history and offense
conduct unrelated to the pecuniary loss, may also play a role in grading and sentencing decisions. Id.
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imprisonment-as the theft of more than twice that amount, up to one million dollars.95 Of course, the court has discretion to impose a sentence at the
lower end of the range (thirty-three months) in the former case, and a sentence at the higher end of the range (forty-one months) in the latter case. But
nothing compels a court to do this." In any event, the harsher sentence is
still only eight months longer than the more lenient sentence, a roughly

twenty-five percent increase in punishment for a crime that inflicted twoand-one-half times as much pecuniary harm.
In sum, pecuniary harms are not ignored by the law; to the contrary, they
play an important role in grading and sentencing crimes. However, the grade
and sentence the law applies to any given offense indicates only that a certain range of pecuniary harm was inflicted. Offenses that are graded and
punished the exact same way may have inflicted similar, but not necessarily
identical, harms. Therefore, it is mistaken to assume that any two thefts nec-

essarily involved the same pecuniary loss just because (1) the law graded
them the same way, and (2) the law punished them identically.
2. PhysicalInjuries

In the same way, the law does an incomplete job of grading and punishing crimes based on the amount of physical harm inflicted. The way the law
grades assaults typifies the way it ignores disparities in the degree of physical injuries, such as broken bones, cuts, bruises, and the like, across cases.
As discussed above in Section I.C, the law makes a distinction between aggravated and simple assault, based on the extent of the victim's injuries. An
assault that causes bodily injury is graded as a simple assault, whereas an
assault that causes serious bodily injury is graded as an aggravated assault.

On the one hand, it seems safe to say that an aggravated assault causes more
physical harm than a simple assault. On the other hand, it does not follow
that all aggravated assaults necessarily cause the same amount of harm.
A wide range of injuries satisfy the definition of serious bodily harm. In
one case, for example, a state court upheld an aggravated assault conviction,
finding (to no surprise) that the victim, who endured internal bleeding, two

heart stoppages during emergency surgery, a collapsed lung, broken palate,
95.
USSG § 2Bl.1(b)(1). Compared to the Texas sentencing system, the federal guidelines
provide a larger number of sentencing ranges for larceny offenses-seventeen versus only seven;
this is mainly due to the fact that Texas law does not make any additional sentencing recommendations once the loss exceeds $200,000, whereas the federal guidelines specify nine sentencing ranges
for crimes involving losses of more than $200,000. Id.
96.

Following Booker, federal judges have wider latitude in making sentencing decisions.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (holding that federal guidelines are no
longer "mandatory," but remain "advisory"); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313
(2004) (finding that Washington State sentencing guidelines violate Sixth Amendment by authorizing a judge to impose a sentencing enhancement on the basis of facts that were not found by a
jury). Since even before Booker and Blakely were decided, Texas has given judges and juries
wide discretion in imposing sentences. See SHARON HOPE WEINTRAUB, TEXAs SENATE RESEARCH CTR., TAKING EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCING 6 (2004), available at http://
www.senate.state.tx.us/SRC/pdf/iboct04.pdf (noting that Texas has never employed determinate
sentencing guidelines of the type invalidated in Blakely).

"Eggshell" Victims

November 2006]

333

fractured rib, and more than five months of rehabilitation following a brutal
beating, had suffered "serious bodily injury."97 The same court upheld an
aggravated assault conviction in another case, ruling that the loss of three
teeth and a scarred lip also constituted "serious bodily injury."98 Clearly the
first victim suffered more harm than the second, but a court still graded the
crimes the same way. (At some point, of course, the degree of physical harm
will increase enough to warrant a higher grade; if the first victim had died,
for example, the crime would be considered homicide, and not assault.)
The sentence the law imposes may provide additional information about
the degree of physical harm that was done in a case (assuming, of course,
that the defendant was caught, convicted, and sentenced). But sentencing on
the basis of physical injuries, like pecuniary losses, is imprecise. Ironically,
in the assault cases discussed above, the defendant who caused the more
serious of the two sets of injuries received the lighter sentence-a suspended sentence versus a three year prison term.99 In short, neither the grade
given nor the sentence imposed in a criminal case indicates precisely the
degree of physical injury that the victim suffered.
3. PsychologicalHarms
The law is even less precise when it comes to grading and punishing an
offense according to the degree of psychological harm inflicted (though the
law clearly does take such harm into consideration). Crime inflicts a heavy
psychological toll on its victims. These psychological harms are distinct
from the physical injuries discussed above, and include a variety of mental
and emotional injuries, such as depression, emotional distress, and Post-

Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), to name a few.c0 By some estimates,
personal crimes alone inflict the equivalent of over $345 billion annually in

"intangible" costs, including psychological harms, compared to $105 billion
in "tangible" costs, such as pecuniary losses and physical injuries.'

97.

State v. Scholten, 445 N.W.2d 30, 31-32 (S.D. 1989) (several defendants kicked victim's

head and body repeatedly, like a football); see also Tracy A. Batemen, Annotation, Sufficiency of

Bodily Injury to Support Charge ofAggravated Assault, 5 A.L.R.5TH 243 (1992) (discussing harms
that qualify as "serious bodily injury").

98.

State v. Bogenreif, 465 N.W.2d 777, 778 (S.D. 1991) (defendant punched victim several

times).
99.

Scholten, 445 N.W.2d at 33 (noting that defendant's sentence was suspended on condi-

tion he pay victim's medical bills); Bogenreif, 465 N.W.2d at 779.
100.
One study found, for example, that the psychological cost of a non-fatal rape (equivalent
to more than $80,000) was roughly sixteen times larger than the tangible costs (around $5,000 including medical care, lost wages, and the like). TED R. MILLER ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
VIcTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 15 (1996); see also Mark A. Cohen, Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crime to Victims, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 537 (1988)
(noting that out of pocket expenses often pale in comparison to the cost of pain and suffering, which
is nonetheless frequently ignored as a part of the overall cost of crime).

101.
tort cases).

MILLER ET AL.,

supra note 100, at 1 (figure calculated using jury awards in comparable
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Furthermore, the degree of psychological harm associated with any
given crime often varies across victims; that is, some victims suffer more
psychological trauma than do others, even when the offense conduct is comparable. To cite one example, clinical psychologists have found that some
victims of crime are more prone to experience PTSD, a psychological malady that can impair a person's daily life, and that some victims of PTSD
recuperate more quickly than others. 02 For a number of reasons, victims
may experience different levels of psychological trauma following similar
criminal incidents. Studies have shown, for instance, that elderly victims of
crime often suffer more psychological trauma than younger victims, even if

other circumstances-the offender's conduct and the tangible physical injuries-are identical. One explanation is that being victimized may reinforce
preexisting doubts about health and independence that are much more
prevalent among the elderly than the young." More controversially, some
commentators argue that crimes that are motivated by hatred of the victim's
race, sexual orientation, or religion, cause more harm than do similar crimes
motivated by other factors (e.g., greed)."' For example, they say that an act
of vandalism inflicts far more distress if it evinces the vandal's hatred
(imagine a swastika painted on a synagogue door), as opposed to his or her
immaturity (imagine a teen's nickname painted in the same place). A variety

102. Christine A. Harrison & Stuart A. Kinner, Correlates of Psychological Distress Following Armed Robbery, 11 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 787, 788 (1998); John H. Laub, Patternsof Criminal
Victimization in the United States, in VICTIMS OF CRIME 9 (Robert C. Davis et al. eds., 1997); see
also NATALIE TAYLOR & PAT MAYHEW, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, FINANCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS OF CRIME FOR SMALL RETAIL BUSINESSES 5 (2002) (in survey of 4,000 small

businesses in Australia, authors found that only ten to thirty-three percent of store owners who had
been burglarized or robbed experienced such symptoms as nightmares, flashbacks, or had difficulty

showing up for work).
103.

LETITIA T. ALSTON, CRIME AND OLDER AMERICANS 99-100 (1986); MILLER ET AL.,

supra note 100, at 15.

&

104.
E.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 57, at 61-63; see also James Garofalo, Hate Crime Victimization in the United States, in VICTIMS OF CRIME 134, 141 (Robert C. Davis et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997)
(finding that victims of hate crimes were more likely to characterize their crimes as "very serious"
and report that they had a "great deal of effect" on their lives); Jack McDevitt et al., Consequences
for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and Non-Bias-Motivated Assaults, 45 AM. BEHAv. SCIENTIST
697, 698 (2001) (reporting study results showing that victims of hate crimes suffered more severe
and longer lasting psychological harm than victims of similar, non-biased motivated crimes). But
see Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081,
1088 (2004) (reviewing literature and rejecting claim that hate-motivated crimes inflict more psychological (or other types of) harm).
Some commentators have criticized hate crimes legislation on other grounds, suggesting, for
example, that whether or not hate crimes "hurt more," criminals who are motivated by hate may not
be any more reprehensible than criminals who are motivated by other considerations. E.g., Dan M.
Kahan, Two Liberal Fallaciesin the Hate Crimes Debate, 20 LAW & PHIL. 175, 187 (2001); Hurd
Moore, supra. This Article remains agnostic on the normative question whether greater harms alone
justify treating hate-motivated crimes more sternly. For present purposes, it is enough to suggest that
some arsons, assaults, vandalisms, and so on, cause more harms than others, because of the offender's motivation.
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of other factors may also play a role in exacerbating (or diminishing) the
psychological costs of crime for some victims.'
For some crimes, the law disregards any psychological harm experienced
by the victim. Hence, the federal sentencing guidelines do not enhance the
sentence for a larceny offense when it causes emotional distress to the victim.'1 And until recently, many jurisdictions declined to treat bias-motivated
crimes as more serious offenses, even though they arguably cause more psychological trauma than identical crimes motivated by other factors. 07
It is common, however, for the law to recognize that some crimes cause
psychological, as well as physical and pecuniary harm, and to grade and
punish such crimes accordingly. Hence, many crimes associated with a high
degree of psychological harm, such as rape, residential burglary, and hatemotivated defacement of property, are graded and punished more sternly
than other crimes that can inflict comparable physical or pecuniary injuries,
such as aggravated assault, commercial burglary, and vandalism. 08
Yet it is rare for the law to distinguish among crimes of the same typerape, residential burglary, or hate crime-based on the degree of psychological harm inflicted (or not inflicted) in individual cases. To put it another
way, the law assumes that victims of each of these crimes all suffer the same
degree of psychological harm. For example, the federal sentencing guidelines distinguish between the burglary of residential and commercial
property. A residential burglary receives a five-level enhancement, translating into an additional fourteen to twenty-six months of incarceration,

because residential robberies carry an increased risk of psychological injury. 10 The same enhancement applies to every residential burglary," 0 even
though some residential burglary victims clearly suffer more. Compared to a

young childless couple, a single parent is likely to be far more disturbed by

105.
Harrison & Kinner, supra note 102, at 788 (noting that marital status, socioeconomic
status, and preexisting psychological trauma influence the degree to which victims will suffer psychological harms from crime).

106. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. (n.3(A)(iii)) (2005) (court may
not consider "emotional distress" for purposes of sentencing larceny offenses).
107.
tion).

See generally LAWRENCE, supra note 57 (discussing the history of hate crimes legisla-

108. Cf Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (recognizing that rape inflicts "mental and psychological damage" and not just physical injury); Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of
"Hate", 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 799, 805 (1999) ("The primary justification for bias crime laws is to redress the greater harms caused by bias crime.").

109.

USSG § 2B2.1, cmt. (backg'd).

110.
Id. Many states take the same approach with respect to hate crimes. The states grade and
punish crimes more sternly when they are motivated by hatred of the victim's race, religion, disability, or sexual orientation. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 2004) (providing, for example, that
a bias motivation changes a crime ordinarily treated as a class A misdemeanor into a felony, with a
corresponding increase in punishment). The same enhancement is applied to all hate-motivated
crimes, regardless of the impact on the victim. See id.; see also POSNER, supra note 57, at 234-35
(suggesting that not all victims of hate crimes suffer special psychic harms, and that hate crime
legislation, as currently formulated, fails to target the more harmful cases); Hurd & Moore, supra
note 104, at 1089 (suggesting that some hate crime victims "may not suffer any greater psychic
trauma than the typical victim of an otherwise-motivated assault").
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a residential burglary, particularly if his children are young and spend time
alone in the home. Still, as long as the offense conduct and pecuniary losses
are similar, these burglaries would trigger the same sentences under the
Guidelines. The fact that one burglary inflicted, say, the equivalent of
$100,000 in psychological harm, while the other inflicted only $10,000 in
psychological harm, usually does not affect the law's characterization of the
offenses. At the very least, the law will not sanction or otherwise treat the
former crime ten times more severely."'
The same crime may thus inflict different levels of psychological harm
on different victims. From an economic perspective, protecting individuals
who would suffer relatively more psychological harm (the eggshell victim)
could prove beneficial even if it meant simply displacing such crimes onto
other, hardier victims.
C. Distinguishing Victim Harms and Offender Benefits
So far, this Article has demonstrated that the law does an imperfect job
of grading and punishing individual offenses according to the harm done in
each case. The assumption that all crimes of a given sort necessarily involve
the same amount of total harm is unrealistic and misleading, for if victims
are heterogeneous, a displaced crime may not be as harmful, in the economic sense, as the one that otherwise would have occurred.
But the assumption that crimes of the same type necessarily inflict the
same amount of harm, regardless of the identity of the victim, also has a
theoretical foundation. Recall that, for a precaution to merely displace a
crime, it must not diminish the criminal's incentive to commit the offense.
This means, in effect, that potential victims must be perfect substitutes in
the eyes of the offender. If a criminal prefers one victim over another, and

only the preferred victim takes a precaution, the criminal may abandon the
effort, rather than settle for a less appealing target. In other words, if victims
appear heterogeneous to criminals, precaution-taking seems likely to deter
crime, and not displace it." 2 The corollary is that if precaution-taking merely
displaces crime, then victims must all be the same, in the eyes of the offenders. Put simply, precautions cannot displace crime and reduce the cost of

crime."

111.

3

The guidelines authorize an upward departure for extreme psychological harm, but the

standard for applying it is set very high. USSG § 5K2.3 (departure for exceptional psychological
injury); United States v. Lara, 975 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing application of upward
departure by finding that victim, a fifteen-year-old illegal immigrant who had been smuggled into
the country, ordered to work as a prostitute to pay off her debts, and threatened at gunpoint after she
tried to flee, had not suffered enough psychological trauma to warrant departure).
112.
This assumes, of course, that the most attractive targets take precautions. See infra Part
III for a discussion of victim incentives to take precautions.

113. Cf Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke, Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 933, 943 (1987) (arguing that it should not
be assumed that a criminal, foiled in an effort to commit one crime, will necessarily decide to commit another one).
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The flaw in this line of reasoning is that criminals do not always gain in
direct proportion to what victims lose from crime. One victim may be a perfect substitute for another, in the eyes of the offender, and yet suffer
significantly less harm from the same crime. The reason is that inflicting
many of the harms discussed above in Sections II.A-B does not confer any
benefits on criminals. The burglar (usually) gains nothing extra by stealing
personal property with sentimental value to the victim, nor does the criminal
generally care whether it costs very much or very little for the victim to re-

place the property, and the robber is not, of course, motivated by the various
"unforeseeable" harms that might occur in the course of her heist. Similarly,
to the criminal, physical injury and psychological harm may be an unfortunate side-effect of crime, and not the reason for committing it. For instance,

the residential burglar may not care whether his victim suffers psychic
trauma-he may even prefer that his victims not suffer harms extraneous to

him, all things considered. Hence, some of the most important and variable
costs of crime have no bearing on the incentives of criminals. Since eggshell
victims do not necessarily represent more attractive targets to criminals, it is
possible that precautions will displace crime from eggshell victims onto
hardier, lower-harm victims, without affecting the crime rate. In short, there

is no theoretical reason to expect displaced crimes to have the same societal
harm as those which otherwise would have been committed.
Of course, some types of harm clearly matter to the criminal. It is one

thing to say that a burglar does not care about psychological trauma; it is
quite another to say the burglar does not care about how much pecuniary

loss his victim suffers. Still, even when the criminal cares about the magnitude of the victim's loss, precaution-taking by high-harm eggshell victims
may result in some displacement of crime, for two reasons. First, the difference between the eggshell victims and low-harm victims may not be large

enough to cause any criminals to forego the crime altogether. Suppose that
thief prefers to rob B, who has $1,000 in property, as opposed to A, who has
$900 in property. If B takes a precaution, thief may rob A instead, as long as
the $900 gain exceeds thief's costs (lost opportunities, expected penalties,
and so on).
Second, precaution-taking by eggshell victims may deter some criminals
at the margin, but other criminals may continue their efforts and turn to lowharm victims instead, because, e.g., these criminals are more skilled or have
fewer opportunities for legitimate gainful employment. To illustrate, suppose that two burglars, X and Y, prey upon a community with 100

households. The cost to commit each burglary is $6,000 for X and $3,000
for Y (suppose Y has fewer other career opportunities or is better at not getting caught than X). Some households are more attractive targets because
they have more to steal. Suppose twenty households have $10,000 to steal

and the remaining eighty households have $5,000 to steal. The burglars have
perfect information on the value of property in each household. Assume

that, absent precaution-taking, each burglar would have enough time to
commit ten offenses. The societal cost of burglary in this community will be
$200,000 (presumably, the burglars will focus on the 20 wealthiest
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households). But suppose that the twenty households with $10,000 in property take a precaution that is effective at thwarting a burglary; the other
eighty households do not take the precaution. X will be deterred by the precaution; he will not find it worthwhile to burglarize the unprotected
households (his cost per household, $6,000, exceeds the gain from the
crime, $5,000). Y, however, will remain a burglar, and commit ten burglaries
in the low-harm households. The precaution generated two distinct social
gains. It deterred ten burglaries against eggshell victims, for a gain of
$100,000 (if we do not count the burglars' utility as part of social welfare).
It also reduced the severity of the ten burglaries that were displaced; the societal cost of those burglaries was reduced from $100,000 to $50,000. We
would underestimate the social utility of the precaution if we were to ignore
this second effect.
The point is that, even when criminals do not view different victims as
perfect substitutes, precaution-taking by more attractive, eggshell targets
may still displace crime onto other, low-harm targets. Existing scholarship
underestimates the value of precautions that both deter and displace crime,
by overlooking the possibility that displaced crimes may be less harmful
than those that would have otherwise occurred, even though the law treats
them no differently.
D. Summary

The way our existing legal codes grade and punish criminal offenses is,
at best, an imperfect indicator of the total harm suffered by crime victims,
and by aggregation, society. For one thing, the law ignores certain types of
harm, such as the loss of sentimental value, in making liability and sentencing decisions." 4 In effect, decisions, such as what to call a particular offense
(simple or aggravated assault, for instance) and what sentence to impose, are
made on the basis of only part of the harm done-usually the part that is
most easily quantified by a court. What is more, the law also disregards
some variations in the magnitude of harm done. The number of crime types
is limited, so offenses involving dissimilar harms are, of necessity, grouped

together. For both reasons, as an empirical matter, the victim of a given
crime, as presently defined, may have suffered a range of harmful results.
Moreover, since criminals do not always reap more rewards by inflicting
greater harms, there is no theoretical justification for assuming that two instances of the same crime necessarily cause identical amounts of harm.
This is not meant as a criticism of the law per se. As discussed above,
there are defensible justifications for ignoring certain harms and grouping
dissimilar cases together. Some harms, such as the loss of sentimental value,
114. The law ignores a variety of other types of harms, in addition to those discussed above.
E.g., USSG § 2B1.1, cmt. (n.3(D)(i)) (loss shall exclude "[ilnterest of any kind, finance charges, late
fees, penalties ... or other similar costs"). Moreover, criteria other than harmful results-offender
characteristics, for example, and offense conduct unrelated to actual harm-also play an important
role in grading and sentencing crime, and may further distort the signal the law sends about the
harms inflicted in individual cases. Cf Berman, supra note 87.
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are difficult for courts to verify or quantify. Other harms arguably have no
bearing on a criminal's culpability, and hence should not play a role in how
society chooses to punish the offense ex post. Indeed, many commentators
have argued that the law should focus even less on harmful results than it
does now."' Moreover, there are practical limitations in terms of the number
of distinctions courts can make across cases. The criminal code must be
simple enough to administer, and that means not all types or degrees of
harm can be considered.
We may not be able to or want to do anything about these shortcomings
in the law. Yet it is important to recognize the law's limited value as an indicator of harm, for otherwise we are prone to make erroneous assumptions
about the social utility of crime-prevention efforts that fail to reduce the
crime rate. In particular, the notion that the victims of crime are heterogeneous, that some victims-eggshell victims-suffer more than others,
undermines the conventional wisdom regarding crime displacement. It is
possible that shifting crime may be socially beneficial. Indeed, the next Part
explains that precautions will reduce the cost of crime, whether or not they
affect the crime rate. Precaution-taking that merely displaces crime is not
rent-seeking behavior, as the conventional wisdom suggests.
III. A THEORY OF BENEFICIAL DISPLACEMENT

This Part builds on the critique of the conventional wisdom to develop a
new theory of beneficial crime displacement. It suggests that when precautions displace crime, they are likely to reduce the cost of crime. Section
III.A explains that eggshell victims have an incentive to take more precautions than do low-harm victims. Hence, criminals will gravitate toward lowharm victims. Section II.B discusses three factors that may distort this market for private precaution-taking: wealth constraints, misinformation, and
domino effects. Section III.C analyzes how the insights generated in this
Article may affect decisions as to how or even whether to regulate private
precautions against crime.
A. Displaced Crimes Are Generally Less Harmful Crimes
This Article proposes that private precautions do not displace crime randomly. Instead, precautions, if they displace crime at all, will tend to
displace it from eggshell (i.e., high-harm) victims onto lower-harm victims.
The reason is that eggshell victims are more likely to take precautions in the
first instance; because they have more to lose from a given crime, they also
have more to gain by taking precautions.''1 By contrast, low-harm victims
See sources cited supra note 60.
116. See ALSTON, supra note 103, at 113 (noting that groups who are most likely to
strengthen home defenses include women, the elderly, and minorities, who also face higher risks or
losses from crime); Anderson, supra note 3, at 625 ("[T]hose who suffer the least from the risk of
115.

injury or death are more prone to enter into or live in proximity to crime."); cf Clotfelter, supra note

12, at 399 (building a demand curve for precautions).
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will spend less on precautions, making them more attractive targets for
criminals, and hence, the more likely victims of displaced crimes. As long
as some low-harm victims refrain from taking precautions-and empirical
evidence suggests that few precautions are taken by the entire (or even the
majority of the) population-displacing crime will reduce the societal cost
of crime."'
Recall that an individual will take a precaution against crime as long as
its cost (C) is less than the reduction in the expected cost of the crime,
which is a function of the crime rate-both before (p) and after (p,) taking
the precaution-and the harm associated with the crime (H). The crime rate
determines, but only in part, the expected loss from a crime; the higher the
crime rate, the higher the expected losses. Studies have shown that, when
the crime rate rises, citizens tend to take more precautions, ceteris panbus."8 But the crime rate is only part of the story.
It seems reasonable to expect that victims also consider the magnitude
of. the loss they would suffer in deciding whether to purchase a precaution
against crime. Hence, eggshell victims-for whom the harm from crime (H)
is larger-will purchase more precautions than low-harm victims do, for any
given crime rate. And victims are likely to consider not only the tangible,
financial costs of crime, but also the other types of harms, such as those discussed above in Part II, that the law tends to ignore or average. For example,
the vacationer, knowing that losing her camera (or wallet, etc.) while on
holiday would prove especially costly, may take extra steps to avoid theft,
compared to someone else who is not on vacation. Similarly, individuals
often take precautions to safeguard possessions that, to a stranger, do not
seem particularly worthy of protection, such as family heirlooms or trinkets
carrying sentimental value." 9 The point is that victims consider the full
range of burdens crime imposes; the larger the burdens, broadly defined, the
more victims spend on precautions. Hence, crime is not likely to be displaced randomly-to and from eggshell victims, for example; instead, it will
tend to be displaced from those who are harmed more by crime, onto those
who are harmed relatively less by it.
To illustrate the theory, imagine a community with a hundred riskneutral residents. In any given year, ten of these residents chosen at random
will suffer a burglary (i.e., the crime rate is ten percent). Imagine that the
117.

And if all victims do take a certain precaution, it is unlikely to displace crime in the first

instance. See Shavell, supra note 6, at 124.

118. E.g., Ann P. Bartel, An Analysis of Firm Demand for Protection Against Crime, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 443 (1975) (finding that firms in high crime areas spend more on precautions than do
firms in low crime areas); Charles T. Clotfelter, Urban Crime and Household Protective Measures,

59 REv. ECON. & STAT. 499, 501 (1977) (reviewing empirical data showing that precaution-taking is
responsive to crime rate); LoTT, supra note 41, at 62 (suggesting that women who are more likely to

be targets of crimes are much more likely to carry handguns than are women in general); Philipson
& Posner, supra note 2, at 408-09 (arguing that precaution-taking responds to crime rate-higher
crime rates result in more precaution-taking, lower crime rates result in lower precaution-taking,

resulting in a self-correcting cycle).
119.

Consider, for example, the measures people take to protect a family pet-people will

often post rewards for the lost family dog that eclipse the cost of replacing the dog.
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harm from a burglary varies across victims. In particular, the total harm to
ninety of the citizens in a burglary would be $10,000; ten citizens, however,
would suffer a much larger loss-$30,000. Suppose as well that these eggshell victims are not necessarily more attractive targets for burglars-they
suffer more because they would lose property with sentimental value, they
would incur higher search costs in replacing property, and so on. Suppose
that any of these citizens could purchase an alarm system for $1,500 that
would eliminate the odds that the citizen would suffer a burglary. It would
not, however, reduce the odds that anyone else would suffer a burglary. Indeed, suppose that precaution-takers advertise their status as such-say, by
posting signs reading "This house protected by alarm!" Citizens who buy
the alarm would actually increase the odds that other citizens would suffer a
burglary, unless they too installed the alarm.
In this scenario, only the ten eggshell victims will take the precaution.
Incurring the cost of $1,500 is worthwhile to them individually, given that
the alarm eliminates an expected loss of $3,000. Precaution-taking among
eggshell victims increases the risk of crime for other, lower-harm victims (to
10/90, or roughly eleven percent). However, the other, lower-harm victims,

will not take the precaution; its cost is more than its benefit (only $1,000),
even after they have become more likely targets (10/90 * $10,000 = $1,111)
compared to the eggshell victims. The precaution did not reduce the number
of burglaries; it only displaced those burglaries. But it still reduced the societal cost of the crime. Without taking the precaution, the expected societal
cost of the thefts (disregarding any gains to the burglars) is $120,000.120 If
the precaution is taken, however, the societal cost of the thefts (disregarding
for the moment the cost of the precaution) is only $100,000. The precaution
reduced the cost of crime by $20,000, for a cost of only $15,000 in precautions, a net gain to society of $5,000. To be sure, the losses of these crimes
have been redistributed; they now fall exclusively upon lower-harm victims.

But in efficiency terms, society as a whole is ahead.
One of the more important insights of this Article is in demonstrating
that victims can do what the police, prosecutors, and courts cannot; victims
can finely tune the level of crime protection to achieve a more efficient dis-

tribution of crime in society.12

'

As discussed above in Part II, the law

attempts to grade and punish crime according to some of the harms done;

crimes inflicting more serious financial or physical harms are typically
graded and punished more seriously than crimes inflicting lesser harms.
The police also tend to prioritize their scarce enforcement resources on the
most harmful crimes (murder, rape, etc.). But public authorities are limited
in the extent to which they can tailor grading, punishment, and enforcement

120.

The expected loss is a function of the number of burglaries committed (10) times the

expected societal cost of each burglary (9/10 * $10,000 + 1/10 * $30,000).
121.
Cf Seidman, supra note 4, at 344 ("[P]rivate enforcement levels allow individual potential victims to fine-tune the level of protection according to the value they set on crime avoidance.").
122. This reflects the theory of marginal deterrence-the notion that the law should be designed to discourage criminals from committing more serious offenses.
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decisions to reflect the harms-particularly the idiosyncratic harms-that
individual victims of crime experience. For example, the government lacks
the information necessary to focus police resources on protecting ex ante
property that has high sentimental value, or even to punish more sternly ex
post the taking of such property; hence the law follows a second-best approach-it ignores sentimental value altogether, and focuses instead on the
market value of property, which is easier to observe and quantify. Thus,
when the government displaces crime, e.g., by targeting crime hot spots
with additional police patrols, there is no reason to expect that it has reduced
the societal cost of crime.' Victims, on the other hand, know more about
their idiosyncratic crime losses ex ante, and they can act on that information
by taking more or less private precaution, as the situation dictates.
The theory of beneficial displacement developed here also does a better
job of explaining the behavior of crime victims. One shortcoming of the
conventional wisdom regarding precaution-taking is that it fails to explain
why, given their assumed similarities, some victims do not take precautions-a necessary condition for displacement to occur in the first instance.
If two victims really are identical, i.e., they experience identical harms, we
should be surprised if only one of them takes the precaution, particularly
since doing so makes the other victim an even more likely target of crime.
Yet particular precautions are rarely adopted by all potential victims, even
when they live in close proximity and appear to face similar crime risks. 2 4
The extant scholarship on displacement cannot resolve this paradox.' But

this behavior can be explained, in economic terms, by recognizing that victims do not suffer identical harms after all. Variations in the magnitude of
crime losses may explain why many types of precautions are not used universally as the conventional wisdom would seem to predict.
123.

Consider New York City's efforts in the 1970s to fight subway crime. Studies revealed

that placing police in certain high-crime subway stations did not reduce the rate of crime; instead,
crime simply migrated to other areas where there were fewer police. E.g., Jan M. Chaiken et al., The

Impact of Police Activity on Subway Crime, 3 J. URB. ANALYSIS 173 (1974). It is implausible to
think that the government somehow succeeded in steering crime away from eggshell victims and
toward lower-harm victims-e.g., there is no reason to expect that passengers at subway stations
that were protected by the police would have lost more than passengers at stations that were not

protected by the police.
124. See Charles T. Clotfelter & Robert D. Seeley, The Private Costs of Crime, in THE COSTS
OF CRIME 213, 221 (Charles M. Gray ed., 1979) (reporting results of a Washington D.C. crime survey: only 15.1% of residents carry something for protection; 84.4% lock apartment; 65.7% leave

lights on when away; and 6% installed bars on windows); NELSON B. HELLER ET AL., NATIONAL
INST. OF LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, OPERATION IDENTIFICATION PROJECTS: ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS 7 (1975) (finding that, even after intensive public advertising
campaign, few communities had more than ten percent of residents participate in anti-burglary prop-

erty identification program).
125.

Many extant models of precaution-taking avoid the paradox by concluding that all vic-

tims do, in fact, take precautions. See Dharmapala & Garoupa, supra note 33, at 199 (in model all
victims take avoidance activities because they are all identical; hence, these activities have no effect
upon the probability of being victimized). This is empirically false-as demonstrated below-but it

also raises a second troubling question. If all victims take precautions, why wouldn't the precautions
deter crime? At least some criminals will abandon their schemes if all victims-and not just a fewhave become more costly targets. Cf Shavell, supra note 6, at 124 (suggesting that precautions
become more effective at deterring crime as more victims take them).
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In summary, victims who stand to lose more from crime will spend more
to protect themselves. Hence, we should expect that displaced crimes will
also be less harmful crimes-no matter how the law grades and punishes
them. To be sure, displaced crimes are still externalities, and precautiontaking that displaces crime may yet be inefficient, but such precautiontaking has a societal benefit that has gone unrecognized in the literature and
policy discourse. Precaution-taking that redistributes crime is not rentseeking behavior. It has a benefit that must be considered in the debate over
victim precautions.
B. PotentialMarket Failures

Of course, there is no guarantee that precautions will only displace
crime onto lower-harm victims. Three factors may distort the "market" for
private precautions. Wealth constraints may prevent some eggshell victims
from taking precautions; misperceptions of the risks of crime may cause

some citizens to take precautions that displace crime onto similarly situated
citizens; and displacement by eggshell victims may trigger a domino effect,
causing lower-harm victims to also take precautions. 12 Each of these possibilities is discussed below.
1. Wealth Constraints
As explained above, we expect eggshell victims to take more precautions; thus, if a precaution merely displaces crime, it should displace it onto
low-harm victims, and in the process, reduce the total cost of crime. A problem arises, however, when some eggshell victims cannot afford to take
precautions. They may become the victims of crimes displaced by wealthier

citizens. To the extent crime is displaced from one eggshell victim to another, the total cost of crime remains the same and precaution-taking is

necessarily wasteful, as the conventional wisdom suggests.
Without a doubt, lower-income families cannot afford some precautions
that might benefit them. The LoJack anti-theft device, considered one of the
most effective precautions against car theft, costs roughly $600 per vehicle,
only part of which is covered by insurers.12 7 Sophisticated home security
systems, which include motion sensors, alarms, and quick response teams,
can cost $10,000 or more. Lower-income families that might be willing to
pay for such protection (because they would suffer the loss of sentimental

value, and so on) may lack the means to do so. Indeed, Professor John
DiIulio has suggested that one of the reasons residents of impoverished in-

ner-city neighborhoods are victimized much more often than their suburban
counterparts is that they cannot afford to spend nearly as much on private

126.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Other factors, such as heterogeneity in the risk
preferences of potential victims, may also distort the market for precautions and the direction of

displacement.
127.

Ayres & Levitt, supra note 25, at 47-48.
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precautions against crime. 28 Generally, the wealthy are also better able to
exit high-crime areas and relocate to safer neighborhoods that are beyond
the reach of some criminals. Thus, it is possible that some crimes are displaced from wealthier eggshell victims, who can afford to protect
themselves, onto poorer eggshell victims, who cannot.

Nonetheless, the magnitude of the distortion caused by wealth constraints will be limited, for three reasons. First, the poor are less attractive
targets for criminals interested in strictly financial gains-by definition they
have less to steal. Thus, precaution-taking by wealthy households is unlikely
to displace property crime onto poor households, even ones that are more
vulnerable. 29 (Recall that in order to displace crime, victims must be good
substitutes in the eyes of criminals.) It seems more likely that precautiontaking by some wealthy households will displace crime onto other wealthy
households-namely, the households of wealthy low-harm victims who take
fewer precautions. Second, even if the wealthy do shift some crimes onto
poor victims, they will not necessarily shift those crimes onto poor eggshell

victims. Since eggshell victims do not necessarily represent more attractive
targets for criminals, some crimes will be displaced onto low-harm victims
(rich or poor) instead. Third, some precautions, such as The Club (roughly
$20)10 or door locks, are relatively cheap, and are within the means of many
citizens. Indeed, some precautions that require heavy time commitments,
such as neighborhood watches, may actually be more affordable to the poor
than to the wealthy, assuming they have a lower opportunity cost of time.
Hence, wealth constraints will not prevent underprivileged eggshell victims

from taking at least some (and perhaps even most) types of precautions.
Thus, although wealth constraints may allow some rent-seeking precaution-

taking to occur, it is unlikely to happen frequently enough to alter the underlying case for beneficial displacement.
A related distortion arises when governments either subsidize or mandate that certain precautions be taken by private individuals or firms.
Because victims do not internalize the cost of taking subsidized precautions,

there is no assurance that eggshell victims will take more precautions than
low-harm victims. Suppose, for example, that the police offer free property
marking services to all residents of one particular neighborhood; suppose
further that this service merely displaces burglars into the neighboring
128.

John J. DiIutio, Jr., Saving the Children: Crime and Social Policy, in SOCIAL POLICIES
210-11 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1996); DiIulio, supra note 2.

FOR CHILDREN 202,

Assuming, however, that a criminal is interested in something other than financial gain or
129.
that a rich and a poor target own comparable goods, precaution-taking by the wealthy may shift
crime onto poor households and may be undesirable, from an economic perspective. After all, the
poor attach sentimental value to their property, suffer psychological trauma, and so on.
130.
At autobam.net, The Club sells for $21.95. Autobar.com, The Club SE Anti-Theft Device, http://www.autobarn.net/clubseandev.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2006).
Clotfelter and Seeley suggest that poorer households are more likely to take time131.
intensive precautions, such as staying home at night, due to their lower opportunity cost of time.
Clotfelter & Seeley, supra note 124, at 228 (finding, in survey of D.C. households, that wealthy
were more likely than poor to install additional locks and that poor were more likely than wealthy to
stay home at night because of crime).
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community. There is no reason to suspect here that the burglaries have been
displaced onto lower-harm victims; quite the opposite may be true. The individuals who took the precaution may have done so not because they had
more to lose from the burglaries, but because they had to pay less for protection. To the extent the crime still occurs, society has not necessarily gained
anything, for the victims may be alike; or worse yet, the victims of the displaced crimes may suffer comparatively more. Similarly, when governments
require that certain precautions be taken, some victims will respond to the
threat of legal sanctions, and not the economic incentive to minimize their
crime losses.
Governments encourage or require private precaution-taking in a variety
of ways. Some cities require taxi cabs to install bulletproof barriers between the passenger compartment and the driver; many state and city
governments require banks to install lighting and control access to automated teller machines; police departments around the country promote the

use of property marking, neighborhood watches, and so on.' Several European nations even issue fines when motorists fail to lock their vehicles upon
parking. These efforts may be aimed at addressing the problems mentioned earlier-that some precautions generate positive externalities or (in

the case of subsidies) that the poor cannot afford protection-but unless
they reduce crime, they are more suspect than private precaution-taking that
is done free of government inducements or encouragement.
To summarize, we expect individuals who stand to lose more from
crime-so-called eggshell victims-to take more precautions. This means
that precautions should normally displace crime (if at all) from these eggshell
victims onto lower-harm victims, resulting in some gain to society. A problem
arises, however, when eggshell victims are unable to afford precautions. They
may become the victims of displaced crimes. Similarly, when governments
subsidize or require precaution-taking, demand for precautions will be influenced by factors other than expected crime losses. It is no longer safe to

assume that displacement reduces the cost of crimes that occur.
2. Information Distortions

Another distortion occurs when citizens are misinformed about the risk
of crime. A low-harm victim who overestimates her chances of being victimized may take a precaution that displaces crime onto other low-harm

victims. Conversely, an eggshell victim who underestimates her chances

132.

Gardiner and Balch identify four distinct strategies governments have adopted to encour-

age precaution-taking: public information campaigns, in-kind public assistance (such as police
recommendations regarding how better to protect property), mandates accompanied by sanctions for
non-compliance, and subsidies. John A. Gardiner & George I. Balch, Getting People to Protect
Themselves, in POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: PENALTIES OR INCENTIvEs? 113, 119-20 (John Brigham
& Don W. Brown eds., 1980).
133.

See id. for a discussion of examples of policies adopted by governments.

134. Philip J. Cook, The Demand and Supply of Criminal Opportunities,7 CRIME & JUST. 1,
23 (1986).
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of being victimized may decline to take a precaution, thus leaving her vulnerable to crimes displaced from other, better-informed eggshell victims.
In both scenarios, precaution-taking shifts offenses without reducing the
total cost of crime.
To illustrate, return to the scenario discussed in Section A above, in
which each of a hundred citizens must decide whether to take a precaution
(costing $1,500) against a ten percent risk of burglary. Ninety of the citizens would lose $10,000 in the burglary; the other ten would lose $30,000.
Above, we found that only the eggshell victims would take the precaution;
the others would not find it worthwhile to spend $1,500 to fend off an expected loss of $1,000 (or even $1,111, after the eggshell victims take the
precaution). But suppose that one of the low-harm victims mistakenly believes that she faces a thirty percent chance of a burglary. This citizen will
now take the precaution. It still costs $1,500, but its perceived value has
risen from $1,000 to $3,000. Once again, however, the precaution has not
deterred the burglar; he still has eighty-nine targets from which to
choose-the other low-harm victims, being better informed about the risks
of crime, still do not take the precaution. The low-harm victim has merely
displaced the risk of crime onto other similarly situated victims. Since the
cost of the crime has not changed, the cost of the precaution ($1,500)
taken by this low-harm victim is indeed a deadweight loss to society.
Citizens may misjudge the risk of crime for a variety of reasons. For
one thing, the way the media portrays crime stories-in both news and
entertainment programs-distorts reality. Some studies suggest, for example, that local news broadcasts inflate the audience's fear of crime,
because they allocate so much airtime to stories about crime. When exposed to constant media coverage of crime stories, citizens may
overestimate the number of violent crimes that actually occur, and hence,
the risk that they will become victims of such crimes. In addition, firms
that market precautions have an incentive to try to make the public feel
more vulnerable to crime, thereby boosting demand for their products or
services. For example, one of the leading providers of home security systems in the United States warns visitors to its website: "DON'T BECOME
A STATISTIC. In the time it takes you to read this sentence, one burglary
will be committed in the U.S."' 36 Although the information contained in

&

135. See, e.g., Vincent F. Sacco, Media Constructions of Crime, 539 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL.
Soc. Sct. 141, 150-53 (1995) (surveying studies analyzing the link between news coverage of crime
and perceptions of crime risk, but noting that results of such studies are mixed). In the chaos that
followed hurricane Katrina, several media outlets reported that gangs were roaming the streets of
New Orleans and committing horrible crimes. The reports provoked fear of crime in the community
and among relief workers. Later, however, a New York Times investigation revealed that most of the
stories of violent crime in New Orleans were simply false or had been grossly exaggerated. Jim
Dwyer & Christopher Drew, Fear Exceeded Crime's Reality in New Orleans, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 29,
2005, at Al. While the media was not entirely to blame--the police had passed along many erroneous crime reports-the episode highlights the power of the media to affect public perceptions of
crime risks.

136. ADT Security Services, Inc., Learn about Security, http://www.adt.com/resi/leam
about_security/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2006).
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the advertisement is accurate, the way it is framed-a burglary every few
seconds-may cause consumers to overestimate the risk that they will fall
victim to this crime.
In brief, some consumers may take too many (or too few) precautions
because they misperceive the risk of crime. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that misperceptions regarding the risk of crime necessarily undermine the theory of beneficial displacement. If all consumers are equally
misinformed, say, they all double their assessment of risk, displacement is
still likely to have some societal benefit-eggshell victims are still more
likely to take the precautions (even though, for some of them, doing so
may be wasteful) and thus displace crime onto lower-harm victims. A
problem arises only if some, but not all, victims are misinformed. Suppose
that some low-harm victims overestimate their risk of crime. These victims may purchase precautions that displace crime onto other low-harm
victims who are better informed. But the best response to this problem

may be to address the underlying cause of the distortion-the misperception of risk, rather than to regulate precaution-taking.

3. Domino Effects
A final problem may arise if precaution-taking by eggshell victims
causes low-harm victims to take the precaution as well. When a precaution

displaces crime, it increases the crime rate for everyone who does not take
it. This raises the expected benefits of taking the precaution and may entice other victims to take it. Under extreme conditions, once some citizens

take a precaution, all others may end up following suit."'
To illustrate how precaution-taking by some may cause a domino effect, contrast two scenarios involving the same precaution. In both, there

are ten individuals, each of whom can take a precaution that would eliminate a ten percent risk of burglary. Nine individuals would lose $500 from
the burglary; the tenth would lose $1,500. In the first scenario, suppose the
precaution costs $75. Only one victim would take it. By doing so, she has
reduced the community's total (expected) cost of crime, even if she has
not reduced the crime rate. The expected loss from the crime, which was

$600, has been reduced to only $500. Indeed, the precaution is efficient
even when taking into consideration its cost ($75), though this will not
always be the case.
In the second scenario, however, suppose that the precaution costs only
$51. Assuming they are risk-neutral and perfectly informed, the nine citi-

zens who would lose only $500 in the event of a burglary would prefer not
to take the precaution. But once the eggshell citizen takes it, their odds of
being robbed have increased from ten percent to roughly eleven percent, a
small increase, but one that is sizeable enough to cross the tipping point:
137.
Clotfelter, supra note 12, at 395 (noting that crime displacement may lead to a tipping
or unraveling effect in which all citizens eventually take a precaution); Hui-Wen & Png, supra
note 33, at 89-91 (suggesting that if one target increases spending on precautions, other targets

are more likely to do so as well).
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all citizens will now take the precaution. The benefit of the precaution to
each low-harm victim is now approximately $55-just slightly more than
the cost of the precaution. The entire community will spend $510 on this
precaution; because all citizens will take it, the crime does not occur.
However, as an empirical matter, it is quite rare that all-or even

most-victims take all available precautions, even though crimes are more
likely to be committed against those who do not take measures to protect
themselves. Even such simple precautions as locking one's door are not
taken by all citizens."' In theory, it is possible that stark differences among
groups of potential victims-in terms of the values they attach to their
goods, the search costs they face in replacing goods, the psychological
costs of crime, and so on-could forestall the domino effect.
Further, even if the domino effect occurs, it is impossible to say that it
will be undesirable. On the one hand, the cascade may prove beneficial:
after all, if everyone takes the precaution, it might deter crime, rather than
4
So long as the costs of the precaution do not exceed the
displace it."'
benefits of the reduced crime rate, the domino effect is actually desirable,
from a social point of view.
C. Rethinking the Regulation of Private Precautions

As discussed above in Section I.D, the threat of displacement has been
used to rationalize policies designed to curtail precaution-taking, or even
ban precautions outright (e.g., by denying permits required to build gates,
etc.), on the theory that such precautions have no social utility whatsoever.
The theory of beneficial displacement offered above changes fundamentally how or even whether society should respond to displacement effects.
To begin, it suggests that concerns over displacement in the private
war on crime are overstated, not because displacement does not occur-it
certainly does, at least to some degree-but because displacement is not
always socially wasteful. To be sure, displacement remains an externality-a cost that precaution-takers

do not consider.

However,

since

displacement also reduces the harm of crime, the waste associated with
precaution-taking is much less significant than previously thought. The
conventional wisdom overlooks the possibility-and indeed likelihoodthat displaced crimes are less harmful crimes, regardless of how the law
138.
Whether or not the precaution has a net societal benefit in this instance depends on
whether one counts the gain to the thief as part of social utility. If we count the gain to the thief
(say, as $500), the precaution has only reduced the cost of crime by $100, but it cost the community $510, for a net loss of $410. However, if we do not count the gain to the thief, the precaution

eliminates an expected $600 loss, at a cost of $510, resulting in a net gain of $90.
139.

See supra note 124.

140.

In economic terms, if the demand curve for precautions resembles a step function

more closely than it does a linear function, a slight increase in the risk of crime occasioned by
others using a precaution will not lead more victims to take the precaution; the increase in the
crime rate would have to pass a certain threshold before more victims would find it worthwhile to
protect themselves.

141.

See Shavell, supra note 6, at 124.
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might categorize them. It follows that there may be no pressing need to
regulate private precautions, as some have suggested, particularly when
displacement is far from total. Displacement is just not as costly as commonly asserted.

Second, the possibility that displacement may be beneficial also suggests that we should modify the way governments regulate precautiontaking. Consider first outright bans on precaution-taking-such as denying
permits to developers of gated communities. The conventional wisdom

suggests that precautions that merely displace crime have no social utility;
outright bans were thus justified on purely economic grounds. But once
we recognize that such precautions can reduce the societal costs of crime,

even without reducing its incidence, it becomes clear that some level of
precaution-taking may be socially desirable. An outright ban is an excessive, and potentially costly, response.

A more nuanced approach would be to tax precaution-taking that displaces crime. Some scholars have suggested imposing a fee on the use of
precautions that displace crime; the fee would be equivalent to the societal
cost of the crime, discounted by the precaution's effect (if any) on the

probability that the crime will occur. 4 2 Under the theory of beneficial displacement, imposing a tax on precautions that displace crime remains an

attractive, albeit politically difficult, policy response. Fees could be used
to force precaution-takers to consider the costs of displaced crimes. However, the theory suggests that calculating such a fee may be more complex
than originally thought, given that crimes inflict variable harms. The size

of the fee imposed should depend on the cost of the crime to displaced
victims, but as demonstrated above, that cost is not the same as the average cost to all victims.

The theory of beneficial displacement also has important implications
for public efforts to encourage precaution-taking. When the government
encourages or mandates precaution-taking, it may distort the market for
precautions. It is possible that such precautions will displace crime onto

higher-cost or similarly situated victims. Hence, policy makers should remain skeptical of efforts to encourage precaution-taking that merely
redistributes crime in society.
CONCLUSION

This Article has identified a flaw in the way the academy has analyzed
the displacement of crime occasioned by the use of private precautions.
The conventional wisdom suggests that precautions that displace crime

&

142.
For a discussion of various proposals to regulate precaution-taking, see Gardiner
Balch, supra note 132. Scholars have devised novel means by which to "tax" precaution-taking.
One proposal would adjust the sanction imposed on criminals according to the victim's precau-

tionary behavior; for example, if the victim takes the socially optimal level of precautions, the
sanction imposed on the criminal will be higher than if the victim takes too much precaution.
Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note 6. This would discourage excessive precaution-taking because it
would make victims who take excessive precautions more attractive targets to criminals.
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only redistribute crime losses but do not reduce them. The implication is
that such precautions are necessarily inefficient, from a social point of view.
The problem with the extant scholarship is that it has overlooked how
the same crime may affect victims differently. The law does an imperfect
and incomplete job of grading and punishing crimes according to the harm
done in individual cases. One of the key insights of the article is in taking
a fresh look at the burdens crime imposes on individuals, and by aggregation, on society. The law grades and punishes criminal offenses in a way
that focuses almost exclusively on tangible harms, while neglecting to
consider various intangible harms that vary from victim to victim. Some
victims suffer the loss of sentimental value, higher search costs, and unforeseeable harms. Once we recognize these costs as important
components of the total costs of crime-in spite of the law's inability to
take them into account-we can see that the same criminal act may harm
different individuals in different ways and to different degrees; some victims will be burdened more, some less, by the same crime. Society is thus
better off when crime is committed against low-harm, as opposed to eggshell, victims.
The Article does not claim that displacement is necessarily efficient.
Any displaced crime, of course, remains an externality, a cost the precaution-taker will not consider. Rather, the main thesis of the Article is that
displacement is not as wasteful as the conventional wisdom suggests. The
externality involved-the displaced crime-is likely to be smaller than the
benefit to the precaution-taker. This means that society gains something
when citizens take precautions that displace crime and do not reduce it. To
be sure, these precautions may be efficient; the reduction in the harmfulness of the crime may easily exceed the cost of the precaution, even for

the last (marginal) precaution-taker. But even if such precautions are consumed at excessive levels, from a social perspective, they are not nearly as

costly to society as once believed. In short, the economic case against displacement has been exaggerated. This insight is perhaps most significant
when considering the desirability of precautions that both deter and displace crime. The presence of even some displacement has been viewed as

a significant drawback, often outweighing any societal gain from the deterrence effect. Once we recognize that displacement has societal benefits
too, however, this unwanted side effect appears less significant, thereby
potentially altering our assessment of precautions with mixed deterrence

and displacement effects.
The normative debate over the desirability of private precautions that

displace crime will not, of course, end here. But this theory of beneficial
displacement is likely to reshape the debate in an important way. By questioning the consensus view that displacement is necessarily wasteful, the
theory suggests that other considerations, besides economic efficiency,
may play a larger role in the scholarly discourse in the future. In particular, the question whether it is "fair" to allow private parties to shift crime
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onto other citizens has suddenly become more relevant, 43 given that displacement may not be economically wasteful after all.

143. One could argue, for example, that eggshell victims suffer more than other victims,
and hence, should be allowed to shift crime onto lower-harm victims, in order to equalize the

burdens of crime in society. Cf Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109
YALE L.J. 507, 510 (1999) (positing that society should strive to equalize the burden of crime,

which is a function of not only the crime rate, but also the cost of crime). On the other hand, one
could argue that displacement is often unjust, because citizens do not have equal access to precautions. Cf. DiIulio, supra note 2, at 11. This Article highlights such issues, but does not take a
position on them.
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